Is Russia an EU alternative for Turkey?

Discussions on Turkey's alternatives to European Union membership have so far widely seen as unrealistic, redundant or marginal efforts. In the past couple of years several Turkish political and military figures, and intellectuals, have suggested giving up the EU membership process and introducing a deeper rapprochement with Russia, China and even Iran towards a regional union. However they merely emerged as emotional responses to what was perceived as the EU's unfair and hostile policies towards Turkey and failed to come up with a convincing detailed alternative strategy.

Despite such a background, recent developments in Turkish foreign policy re-fuel these discussions and necessitate a closer look particularly at Turkish-Russian relations. Two concrete trends deserve particular attention here: First of all, the great loss of confidence among Turkish decision-makers as well as the public on the future of the EU accession talks, largely due to the Cyprus stalemate and new hurdles introduced to the membership process. Secondly, parallel to that we are witnessing much more close political and security dialogue, and deepening of economic ties between Ankara and Moscow.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with Russian President Vladimir Putin five times last year, and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer is paying an official visit to Moscow this week. Not to mention dozens of other regular visits between high-level officials of the two countries. Under these conditions, some Turkish analysts started to argue that Turkey should immediately make up its mind, give up an open-ended EU process and work towards other alternatives, mainly deepening relations with the Russia.

However, according to Russian Ambassador to Turkey Petr Vladimirovic Stegniy, for today Turkey's EU process is not something Moscow views as harmful for development of Turkish-Russian relations.

"In principle we look our cooperation with the EU and your cooperation with the EU as complementary," Stegniy told the TNA in an interview to be published this week. The Russian ambassador says Moscow is not aspiring to become an EU member for obvious reasons, but they have a positive view of Turkey's EU process.

"This is because first of all Turkey wants it," he said. "Secondly, we have a more predictable neighbor who is playing with European standards. And if we launch an adaptation process in time, we can avoid any possible implication to our bilateral relations."

This is Moscow's "politically correct" look at the current Turkish-EU relations, if Turkey will continue its desire for EU membership process. However, it is obvious already from now that Turkey's EU process will enter into a much more difficult period in the coming months, mainly due to the Cyprus problem and also increasing Turkey-skepticism in countries like Austria and France. On a larger scale, Europe is going through deeper economic and political problems and an identity question, which further complicates Turkey's EU process.

On the other hand, Russia is showing more assertive signs in terms of the economy, stronger involvement in regional and global problems and also desire for a closer cooperation with Turkey. Although we had in the past mere rhetoric on the opportunities for closer ties of Turkey and Russia, today we have more practical concrete cooperation mainly in economics and trade, but not limited to that, and also increasingly including politics and security.

Under these conditions, one could say that the glass is half empty and half full in both Turkey's difficult EU process and its promising relations with the Russia. They are still developing and will be shaped by significant decisions in the coming months and developments in the coming years.

It would be wrong to derive a simple and quick conclusion for the time being that the Russia is becoming an alternative to the EU for Turkey. But one thing is clear: If the EU loses Turkey, Russia is waiting to become Turkey's main partner.

A better way to restore faith in official statistics

Independence for national statistics requires more than frequent repetition of the word independent.


British official statistics have never fully recovered from the 1980 Rayner report. Derek Rayner suggested that the purpose of government information was to serve the needs of government. His experience was drawn from Marks and Spencer, the retail company where he had been managing director, and the model in his mind was a management information system. But ministers are not managers and their needs are often for propaganda rather than facts. Accurate public information is a prerequisite of democracy.

Government statisticians are honest people and do not make numbers up. But the increasingly acute problems of official statistics are all familiar from private sector accounting.

Whenever accountants and statisticians establish rules, private companies and government departments manage their affairs in line with their letter rather than their spirit. The most egregious example is devices that take long-term liabilities off the balance sheet. Those used in the British government?s private finance initiatives have essentially the same structure as devices used creatively at Enron.

Statistics may be misused in contexts other than those intended. The value of health services increases as incomes rise and it can be argued that this increases the value of health output even if outcomes and procedures are unchanged. This statistical adjustment provides no basis whatever for claims that the National Health Service is more efficient. But the assertion grabs a headline, and it is only much later that pedantic journalists and academics can discover what is actually going on.

Such misrepresentations are now common. Decentralisation of responsibility for the production of official statistics, a product of the Rayner years, has created a two-tier system. Statistics produced by the Office for National Statistics, which operates to internationally agreed criteria, are of higher quality than those produced by departments. Loss of confidence in official statistics is common to the public at large and among professional users, who recognise specific instances of abuse.

These professional users gave a cautious welcome to the government?s announcement last year of independence for the ONS. But the consultative paper that followed suggests that this announcement itself was puffery not fact. The proposal could not even in principle address the main issue ? the declining quality of departmental statistics ? unless responsibility for these figures was given to the ONS, an option firmly rejected. The document also rejects all specific suggestions for greater independence made by bodies such as the Statistics Commission and the Royal Statistical Society: separating statistical information from political statements, reducing access by ministers to new data before their release, giving parliament a defined role in the appointment of the National Statistician.

We are expected to derive confidence from the recategorisation of the ONS, a government department responsible to the Treasury, as a non-ministerial department subject to the oversight of a ministerial department, not specified but expected to be the Treasury.

The proposed strengthening of the board of the ONS might improve its management but the effect on independence depends on whom the government appoints. There are few grounds for optimism. The most substantive proposal in the white paper is the abolition of the Statistics Commission, which reviews all government statistics, and has made itself unpopular with government by proving itself robustly independent.

If the government were serious about independence for national statistics, then there is a readily available model in the National Audit Office, which has complementary responsibilities. The head of the office is appointed jointly by parliament and government and reports directly to an assertively bipartisan parliamentary committee.

The equation of independence for statistics with incessant repetition of the phrase ?independence for statistics? is faintly Orwellian. When a man tells you frequently how honest he is, keep hold of your wallet.

US Jews open their wallets for Israel

Hizbullah rockets may have stopped for now - but the American Jewish response to the crisis has not.

When American Jews think about Israel's war with Hizbullah, they recall numbers - 1948, 1967, 1973 - that mark previous wars of survival for the Jewish state. They also respond in numbers - dollars, that is.

"Philanthropically, American Jews feel such a sense of connectedness to Israel," said Darrell Friedman, a consultant to the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and former president of Baltimore's Jewish federation.

When Jews feel their homeland is under siege, their philanthropic instincts kick into high gear.
"It's our tradition," Friedman said. "Jews will take care of Jews."

That's evidenced by the innumerable emergency campaigns under way and by the mere existence of the North American Jewish federation system, an unparalleled philanthropic network among American ethnic groups.

On August 7, the United Jewish Communities federation umbrella launched a massive campaign to ease the humanitarian crisis in Israel, with the goal of raising hundreds of millions of dollars. So far it has raised $173 million.

Much of those funds are being channeled through programs being run by the UJC's main overseas partners, the JDC, which provides humanitarian relief in Israel and abroad, and the Jewish Agency for Israel, which manages immigration and absorption in Israel and Zionist education worldwide.

The UJC campaign is the Jewish community's largest fund-raising response, but the options for giving right now are broad. The crisis has given rise to new organizational partnerships, has brought certain groups to prominence and has elicited a mix of approaches to fund raising.

Efforts have focused on emergency services like first aid, upgrading bomb shelters, sending children from the northern region to summer camps in the center of the country and feeding and housing Israelis who have fled their homes.
But the needs are still developing and are sure to grow after the war, as Israelis begin rebuilding their cities and their lives.

The tenuous cease-fire reached Monday does not change that fact - and it's an open question how long the cease-fire will last.

The Israel Emergency Campaign was "established with a long-term view," UJC spokesman Glenn Rosenkrantz said. "So many needs exist, including economic revival, infrastructure and facility rebuilding, support for victims of terror and post-traumatic stress counseling for Israelis being among them."

Even as the UJC announced initial plans to raise $300m., its board determined that another $200m. would be necessary.

"It's a moving target," said Howard Rieger, UJC's president and CEO.

As the needs of the month-long war became apparent, private and public philanthropies began working together to respond.

The Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies' after-school program for disadvantaged Israeli youth ran a special operation in bomb shelters with support from the Jewish Agency and the JDC.
Like many other foundations, the Bronfman philanthropies used supplemental funds for the crisis in Israel to avoid detracting from other programs.

"There's no question that we've seen people reallocating, but I think what's been more striking is the number of people that we've seen not wanting to reallocate," said Mark Charendoff, president of the Jewish Funders Network, whose 1,200 members include some of the biggest Jewish names in philanthropy around the world.

Most foundations already have set their budgets and commitments, so the principals are taking money from their personal wealth, he said.

Either right or wrong

Either right or wrong

Oppose British policy on its merits - not because it makes us a target

Roy Hattersley
Monday August 14, 2006
The Guardian


I have been an opponent of the American occupation of Iraq ever since I realised that Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction only existed in Tony Blair's imagination. And I am equally opposed both to Israel's disproportionate response to Hizbullah's rocket attacks and to the prime minister's support for the assault upon Lebanon. What is more, I have no doubt that tacit acceptance of the slaughter in Beirut and Baghdad makes this country a target for al-Qaida terrorists and provides the friendly hinterland of sympathisers in which all urban guerrillas need to take refuge.

That being said, I still regret that the letter sent on Friday to the prime minister by leaders of the Islamic community implied that the increased threat that Britain's foreign policy guarantees is in itself a reason for changing the government's position. The reason policy should be changed is the simple fact that the policy is wrong. To demand a shift because it will reduce the risk of suicide bombing is to diminish the case for altering course from a matter of principle to a question of self interest.
If Israel were waging a just war against Lebanon, and the prospect in Iraq was progress towards the liberal democracy that George Bush glibly promises, the dangers would have to be accepted with good grace. Unless, that is, we believe that Britain can withdraw from the rest of the world, secure in what WH Auden called our "tight little right little island". If we are to follow Robin Cook's lead towards an ethical foreign policy, Britain must be more engaged in international affairs, not less. Our foreign policy must be measured against moral criteria, not the risks of more explosions on the underground, horrific though that prospect is.

There are already too many siren voices arguing that the tragedy in Lebanon is "nothing to do with us". Commentators who ought to know better are urging Britain to let the Israelis and Lebanese "get on with it" as if they were louts outside a bar, engaged in a brawl that all sensible people would hurry past. Nato intervention actually halted Balkan genocide after the break-up of the Yugoslav federation.

When it is right to go in we should accept the consequences. Arguing that we should pull out to save our skins is a diversion from the central issue. It also enables supporters of the wrong policy to strike heroic postures - bear any burden, accept any hardship, face any foe. So we should when our cause is just. In the case of Iraq and Lebanon our cause is beyond justification. That is the only issue and the only argument.

There is a second reason that the letter is a matter for regret. It will be interpreted by the mendacious and malicious as proof positive that Muslims in general have at least a sneaking sympathy for people who hope to blow up airliners in mid-flight. That is, of course, palpable nonsense. But the alienation of young Muslims is a subject that has to be discussed with care. No informed person doubts that it is happening. It began long before they were offended by Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses almost 20 years ago. But it usually results in no more than rejection of the society that has shown them, and their religion, so little respect. The Muslims I know, and used to represent in parliament, often feel undervalued. But their attitude to suicide bombing is no different from that of the nominal Christians who live next door.

When the signatories to Friday's letter meet the prime minister they should not spend much time on the increased threat that our foreign policy attracts. They ought to discuss the merits and the morals of his attitude towards Beirut and Baghdad. Does he still think that the creation of a democracy in Iraq is more likely than civil war, and how does he justify an intervention that results in more murders each day than during Saddam Hussein's regime? And why is Israel given carte blanche to occupy whichever parts of its neighbours' territory it chooses? The answers are bound to reveal that Britain is on the wrong side of the argument. That is the important thing to be said about our policy towards Iraq and Lebanon.

Max Boot: Radical Ideas for Iraq

PRESIDENT BUSH admitted in late July that the security situation in Baghdad was "terrible" and announced that he was sending more troops to quell the violence. Because this is what I advocated in a May 24 column, I should be happy with the president's decision. But, alas, as with so many American initiatives in Iraq, it's too little, too late.

The security situation in Baghdad has been in free fall since the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra on Feb. 22. In retrospect, that attack appears to be a turning point when the chief problem in Iraq went from being a Sunni-dominated insurgency to a civil war in which Shiite and Sunni militias are equally culpable. The result has been a horrifying surge in violence, with about 100 Iraqis dying every day, the bulk of them in Baghdad.

To restore order in the capital, I suggested adding at least 35,000 U.S. troops ? in line with Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez's comment in 2004 that he needed two divisions to control Baghdad. But that's not what Bush is sending. To bolster the 9,000 U.S. troops already in the capital, he is sending another brigade from northern Iraq, for a total of 13,000 U.S. troops, or less than one division. There will be an equal number of Iraqi troops ? along with 35,000 Iraqi police officers, who are so sectarian and corrupt that they are more part of the problem than the solution.

If Bush thinks that a force this size can secure a city of more than 6 million people, he's not listening to the best professional military advice. An additional problem is that moving troops around Iraq, instead of sending extra units, may improve the situation in one spot but worsen the environment elsewhere. As a "senior American military official" in Iraq told McClatchy News Service, "You can't do clear-and-hold with the force structure we have."

If the present strategy doesn't work, what's the alternative? The most radical course would be a total U.S. withdrawal. The likely result would be an all-out civil war in which Iraqi casualties could easily soar to 1,000 a day and the price of oil could go above $100 a barrel. Proposals to carve up Iraq into three separate states ? Sunni, Shiite and Kurd ? would not ameliorate the violence because major cities such as Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk are full of different religious and ethnic groups that would fight for control.

THINGS MIGHT ultimately work out if the current, moderate Shiite leadership were to prevail. But the more likely result would be the empowerment of radicals on both sides, with someone like Muqtada Sadr taking over in Baghdad and a rump, Taliban-style Sunni state being carved out of western Iraq. U.S. prestige would be deeply wounded, and Islamist terrorists would be encouraged to keep attacking us outside Iraq.

No wonder almost all Iraqi political factions are opposed to a U.S. pullout. They know what horrors would ensue.

But there's another course short of withdrawal: reducing U.S. forces from today's level of 130,000 to under 50,000 and changing their focus from conducting combat operations to assisting Iraqi forces. The money saved from downsizing the U.S. presence could be used to better train and equip more Iraqi units. A smaller U.S. commitment also would be more sustainable over the long term. This is the option favored within the U.S. Special Forces community, in which the dominant view is that most American soldiers in Iraq, with their scant knowledge of the local language and customs, are more of a hindrance than a help to the counterinsurgency effort.

Make no mistake: This is a high-risk strategy. The drawdown of U.S. troops could catalyze the Iraqis into getting their own house in order, or it could lead to a more rapid and violent disintegration of the rickety structure that now exists.

Which path should we take? My preference remains deploying more soldiers, not fewer. A couple of divisions in Baghdad, if skillfully led, might be able to replicate the success that Col. H.R. McMaster's 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment had in pacifying the western city of Tall Afar, where the troops-to-civilians ratio was 10 times higher than in Baghdad today. But at this point, I am also open to a substantial reduction in troop numbers because the current strategy just isn't working.

Bush needs to do something radical to shake up a deteriorating status quo if we are to have any hope of averting the worst American military defeat since Vietnam.

LA Times

Turkish Grand Prix ? 25th-27th August 2006

The Circuit

The brand new, state-of-the-art International Circuit of Kurtkoy, located at Pendik, 80km (50 miles) east of Istanbul hosted the first ever Turkish Grand Prix in August 2005. The event was deemed such a success that the Circuit will again play host to world's most glamorous race in 2006.

How to Get There

There are regular direct scheduled flights from both London Heathrow and Manchester to Istanbul?s Atatürk Airport with Turkish Airlines and British Airways. A twice daily Easyjet service between London Luton and Sabiha Gokcen Airport on the City's Asian side is due to commence on 29th June 2006. Fares start from £30.99 one-way including taxes.

It is also possible to travel via European capital cities with the relevant national airline, e.g via Paris with Air France. For further information, please refer to the How to Travel page.
The circuit is situated on the Asian side of the City, 6km from the junction of Kurtkoy and to the north of the TEM Motorway, the connecting route between Istanbul and Ankara.

Transport services from the City Centre to the Circuit will be available.

Tickets and Tour Operators

Tickets are on sale through Biletix, the official agent of race organisers MSO Istanbul.
Other operators offering ticket only and package deals include:
Airtrack Motor Sport
Page& Moy
Motor Racing International
Turkeygrandprix.com
IAH Holidays

Where to Stay
As the industrial and cultural capital of Turkey, Istanbul is home to some ten million people. The City?s unique atmosphere and rich history have served to attract an increasing number of tourists. As a result, there is ample accommodation throughout the City to suit all budgets ? from five star opulence and historic boutique hotels to intimate guest houses and pansiyons.
Please visit our Hotel Guide for further information.

Further Information

Turkey Hotel Guide features a comprehensive database of hotels in and around Istanbul.
Istanbul Otodrom is the official project website of the Formula 1 Istanbul Racing Circuit and contains up-to-the-minute information on the progress of track construction.
Istanbul.com is a useful source of information for visitors to the City.

US-Turkey Nuclear Cooperation: What Does It Mean for Turkey?

The Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement between the United States and Turkey, signed by the two sides on July 26, 2000, has recently been ratified by the Turkish government. The agreement rightly and by definition prohibits Turkey from exploiting the cooperation for any purposes which would directly or indirectly help her develop military nuclear capabilities, which is something that both parties would seemingly agree upon.


However, beyond limiting Turkey?s prospective nuclear capabilities to civilian purposes, the agreement seems to aim at bringing even Turkey?s civilian nuclear projects under US control. As such, for the United States, the US-Turkish Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is a diplomatic triumph whereas, for Turkey, it seems to be nothing more than self-shackling, and a voided attempt at developing even civilian nuclear capabilities.
A Critical Analysis of the Agreement: What it means for Turkey
The US-Turkey Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is essentially an affirmation of both countries? support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As such, the agreement prohibits Turkey from using any nuclear capability it might develop for military purposes and directly or indirectly assisting any other country to develop military nuclear capabilities. However, while it should be equally binding on the United States too, apparently it will not be so.
The Bush Administration has recently passed a resolution in Congress which will enable it to sell nuclear technology, material and equipment to India for the construction of 22 new nuclear reactors, eight of which will be exempt from the IAEA inspection and are likely to be used for military purposes. Therefore, the nuclear civilian cooperation agreement and the so-called affirmation of support for the IAEA objectives constitute simply a pretext to enable the US to increase its influence on Turkey?s prospective nuclear projects and to grant itself the legitimacy to interfere.
Moreover, the benefits of the agreement seem to be rather rhetorical than substantial. The agreement suggests that the parties can collaborate in research and development toward civilian purposes, design educational and staff exchange programs, and co-organize workshops and conferences. Yet, it prohibits the transfer of critical nuclear technology between the parties, or in more practical terms, prohibits the transfer of the critical nuclear technology from the United States to Turkey. Similarly, the agreement imposes a limit to the amount of nuclear material that Turkey can obtain from the US. That is, Turkey cannot obtain the necessary quantity of nuclear material to run its nuclear reactors efficiently, but rather only as much as the amount determined in the agreement.
In addition, the agreement consists of conditions regarding the storage, re-transfer, re-processing and enrichment of the nuclear materials that are likely to complicate or even stall future nuclear cooperation between the US and Turkey. First, the plutonium, uranium 233 and/or enriched uranium produced from the nuclear materials transferred or to be transferred, or through the use of these nuclear materials can be stored in only where both parties agree upon.
The biggest challenge to satisfying this condition would be to bring not only the US and Turkish government, but also the Turkish public opinion into equilibrium. Second, Turkey will not be able to sell third parties any material and/or equipment which it produces by using the nuclear material and/or equipment transferred via this agreement, without American approval. Third, the nuclear materials produced through either direct or indirect use of the nuclear material transferred via this agreement will not be re-processed unless the both parties agree. Finally, the uranium transferred or produced via the material or equipment that has been transferred will not be enriched unless both the US and Turkey agree.
Even though the statements in the agreement frequently repeat the phrase ?unless both parties agree,? since there are only two involved parties, it practically means ?unless the United States agrees or allows Turkey to?? That is, Turkey may follow any policy regarding the storage, re-transfer, re-processing and enrichment of the transferred nuclear material only if the United States allows her to do so.
The wording of the agreement is particularly important given past experience of US-Turkish relations. The agreement states that the United States will try to provide the nuclear fuel on time, which is necessary for Turkey?s prospective nuclear reactors to run efficiently, economically, securely, and continuously. In other words, the failure to provide the necessary fuel to the reactors on time or the possible disruptions in its supply will cause the very nuclear reactors to run inefficiently, uneconomically, insecurely, and disruptively. No need to mention that the discontinuity of the nuclear fuel supply will simply turn the nuclear reactors into useless constructions dangerous for both human health and the natural environment.
The critical word in this section of the agreement is that the US will try to deliver on this promise of nuclear fuel supply. Interestingly enough, the former-Chief of General Staff I. Hakki Karadayi opposed the AKP government?s envisioned support to the United States by reminding that Dick Cheney, when US Secretary of Defense, promised that the United States would try to compensate for Turkey?s economic losses because of the First Gulf War, during the Ozal government. Karadayi noted that the promised compensation never came through.
For the Turks, One Thing to Cheer About
At the least, there is still one thing for Turkey to cheer about with this agreement. As far as the information revealed to the media suggests, the agreement does not prohibit Turkey from developing similar civilian nuclear partnerships with other countries, and does not confine Turkey to purchasing the necessary nuclear technology, fuel, material and equipment only from the United States. Therefore, Turkey may still seek other suppliers who are willing to be more accommodating in their interactions with Turkey.
Such suppliers could possibly be France, Canada, or closer to home, Russia and Israel. Developing such diversified supply channels would also comply with the United States? practice, in that it has already cemented civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with 47 countries, and is now about to sign one with Russia.
Indeed, the Bush Administration has recently embarked on negotiations with Russia, which could eventually lead to a nuclear civilian cooperation agreement between the two countries. The idea of the US-Russian nuclear cooperation initiative has received harsh criticism from both Republican and Democratic congressmen, most notably from Arizona?s Republican Senator John McCain (R-AZ), who views the initiative as a reward for bad behavior on the part of Moscow and as assisting the restoration of autocracy in Russia.
However, administration officials have stressed the beneficial aspects of the deal. Nicholas Burns, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, suggests that working with Russia on a civilian nuclear cooperation is in the American national interest since Russia has proven itself a key player in negotiations with Iran. Similarly, with the recently renewed US-Indian nuclear partnership, the Bush administration claims to have aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The only problem with the initiative seems to be that it is likely to help India develop nuclear weapons instead.
Actual practice has shown that the so-called ?civil nuclear cooperation agreements? do not necessarily curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, despite their stated intent to do so. Rather, the parties to such agreement view them simply as a means for pursuing their national interests. Depending on how you define them, civil nuclear agreements may well yield to developing military nuclear capabilities as well. The only thing that involved parties must be careful about is how the other side perceives the agreement and accordingly words its conditions.

balkanalysis.com