Cumartesi, Nisan 29, 2006

Turkey sides with Moscow against Washington on BlackSea Force

Ankara and Moscow joined forces to reject the U.S. administration's proposal to expand a NATO-led Mediterranean counterterrorism effort into the Black Sea. Turkey and Russia's joint opposition to the U.S. request underscores the two countries' growing wariness of U.S. strategic designs in the wider Black Sea region.

Turkey and Russia have long been reluctant to allow the extension of NATO's naval Operation Active Endeavor from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea (see EDM, February 17, 2005). But now the rift between the long-time NATO allies, the United States and Turkey, has come into the open. "We would certainly be in favor" of the expansion, Kurt Volker, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, said in Washington on February 24. But the senior diplomat conceded that the Black Sea littoral states had different views on this issue -- "from more enthusiastic to less enthusiastic."

Quite unsurprisingly, the "more enthusiastic" countries are new NATO members Romania and Bulgaria as well as the pro-Western Ukraine and Georgia. The countries that are not terribly happy to see the NATO vessels in the Black Sea are Russia ? whose attitude is understandable -- and Turkey -- whose stance, undoubtedly annoys Washington. Indeed, Volker specifically pointed to Ankara's position, saying that Washington is not going to "be pushing NATO in against the wishes of any NATO allies, particularly Turkey." The State Department official's comments appeared to be the first on-the-record remarks by the United States on the Black Sea Force issue, which means, some Turkish and international analysts suggest, that Washington had decided to go public about the rift.

Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) was created in late 2001 following the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States. The force -- a combination of naval units from the United States, Britain, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey -- has the task to fight criminal and terrorist activity in the Mediterranean theater. Russia joined OAE at NATO's invitation, but Moscow is categorically against OAE's expansion into the Black Sea. Turkey appears to be viewing Russia's position with understanding. "There's not much point in engaging in efforts that unnecessarily would raise tensions in the Black Sea region," one Turkish official was quoted as saying.

Turkey's policymakers and analysts cite two main reasons behind the country's opposition to the U.S. proposal. First, Ankara fears the erosion of the Montreux Convention, a 1936 accord that puts the Turkish Straits under Turkey's control. Second, the Turks argue that OAE is simply redundant as the two already existing Black Sea naval force structures with NATO connections are sufficient to do the job. "The Black Sea littoral states have the capacity to carry out the mission through Black Sea Harmony and BlackSeaFor," one Turkish official suggested. "We're a NATO member, and we see no need for greater NATO involvement in the Black Sea."

(Turkey launched Black Sea Harmony in 2004 to patrol the southern segment of the Black Sea. Recently, Ankara extended an invitation to other littoral countries to join its security initiative. The Black Sea Naval Task Force, or BlackSeaFor, was set up in 2001; the group comprises all six riparian states.)

It would seem, however, that the real reason behind Turkey and Russia's opposition to Washington's move is that the two countries likely perceive U.S. policies in the Black Sea and Caucasus region as being potentially destabilizing to their vital interests. Symptomatically, in 2005, when Russia blocked a U.S. request to get observer status in the Istanbul-based Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization (BSEC), Turkey, the group's formal host and supposedly Washington's "strategic ally," did not raise a finger to help obtain a positive decision. It took the lobbying of other BSEC members to push the U.S. candidacy through.

Both Ankara and Moscow are extremely keen to preserve the status quo in the region and they perceive the West in general and Washington in particular as dangerous agents of change. The calls for the West's more aggressive involvement in the region -- such as, for example, a recent policy paper penned by high-profile U.S. analysts and titled "The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom" -- cannot fail to rattle Turkish and Russian strategists. While Turkey is particularly concerned about potential instability on its northeastern borders (similar to the crisis unfolding on its southeastern borders in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq), Russia is primarily seeking to ward off Western penetration of its traditional sphere of influence.

Remarkably, the veiled U.S. criticism of Turkey's stance came amid the growing military cooperation between Ankara and Moscow. On February 27, Russian-Turkish naval exercises kicked off in the Black Sea. The joint maneuvers appear to have crowned the visit to Turkey by Russian Navy Commander Admiral Vladimir Masorin.

By Igor Torbakov
(Turkish Daily News, March 1; Itar-Tass, February 27; Ifri.org [Russie.Nei.Visions no. 8, January 2006]; Policy Review, no. 125 [2004])

http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370832

What Role For The Blacksea Region in EU's Energy Strategy

The European Union is urgently drafting for release within the month a Green Paper on Energy, which may be the first in a series of Energy Papers from Brussels. The move responds to the twin problems that suddenly alarmed the EU and the United States in recent weeks: Three rounds of interruptions in energy deliveries from Russia to Europe, coupled with a continuing slide into European overdependence on Russian supplies.

Officially, Brussels and Washington are only beginning sotto-voce to acknowledge those two sides of that problem. But they have yet to focus on the dangerous nexus now forming between disruptions by Russia or in Russia and growing dependence upon Russia. Of those three interruptions, two were man-made in Russia but occurred in the Black Sea region, highlighting this region's key role in Western energy security.

Compounding Moscow's leverage as supplier, its middleman-monopoly on eastern Caspian hydrocarbons is a novel type of leverage, usable on the producer countries as well. Additionally, Moscow seeks footholds in downstream infrastructure of European countries for a third type of leverage.

The winter's events have highlighted these long-neglected, but now mounting, risks to the energy security of the enlarged West and its partners in Europe's East. The relevance of EU policy will hinge on identifying these risks and calling for the development of a common energy security strategy. This must be based on diversification of supply sources, with direct access via the Black Sea region to the eastern Caspian as a major objective; and on ensuring national or EU control (as opposed to Russian control) of energy transport systems in Europe.

The EU's initiative must also stipulate consultation and coordination with the United States toward an overall Western strategic concept and measures for energy security. The Paper ought to clarify that energy security has become a key dimension to overall Euro-Atlantic security, and on that basis propose the establishment of a standing EU-United States consultative mechanism that can evolve into a policy-planning framework.

Were the EU to stop short of proposing a Euro-Atlantic approach, then consideration might be given to asking NATO to initiate such an approach to energy security. A start to discussion of this problem within NATO would seem to be a natural development. The alliance has rapidly evolved into a multidimensional security organization; energy security has become more critical to the enlarged West's overall security than at any time in modern history; and NATO remains the principal trans-Atlantic consultation and policy-making forum.

The EU is moving piecemeal toward its declared long-term goal of a common foreign and security policy; but it has never proposed to develop a common energy-supply policy or at least an energy-security strategy. Such a step can no longer be delayed after this winter's experience. The Energy Paper is the right vehicle for announcing that goal and proposing the necessary institutional format.

Any EU strategy must recognize the centrality of Caspian oil and gas to the problem of diversification away from dependency on Russia. However, preliminary indications suggest that the Paper will focus mainly on diversifying the types of energy being used, and less so on diversifying the oil and gas supply sources in general or obtaining direct access to Caspian reserves in particular. While conservation and saving, greater use of renewable sources, and adding storage capacity on EU territory are all necessary measures, it would be unrealistic to expect any significant decline in hydrocarbon requirements for at least the medium term.

A viable strategy for supply diversification should aim to link the EU with the transit and producer countries in the Black Sea and Caspian basins. The EU Paper can clarify Western energy interests in this area as opening direct access to eastern Caspian supplies, not through Russian territory; and ensuring that countries traditionally carrying Russian energy to Europe -- mainly Ukraine and Moldova -- do not lose control of their transit systems to Gazprom or other Russian interests. At the moment, the first goal has not yet been declared, and the second goal is in jeopardy as Moscow began setting the stage this winter for ultimate transfers of control over those transit systems.

Transit projects indispensable to EU and overall Western energy security (as defined above) and vital to anchoring the countries of Europe's East include, among other proposals:

1) a Trans-Caspian westbound pipeline for Turkmen gas via the Black Sea region. The 1990s proposal for 16 to 32 billion cubic meters annually looks un-ambitious in retrospect. EU and other requirements (e.g., Ukrainian and Balkan) and the gas export potential of Turkmenistan -- meanwhile augmented by that of Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan -- warrant a higher target;

2) a Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan oil transport system to feed into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, with a ramification from Tbilisi to a Georgian Black Sea port. These can become the main non-Russian routes for Kazakhstan's super giant Kashagan oilfield's output. Transport to Baku by five medium-capacity tankers, as proposed, can provide a short-term palliative. The necessary solution will be a westbound pipeline on the Caspian seabed;

3) expansion of the Shah Deniz (Azerbaijan)-Tbilisi-Erzurum (Turkey) gas pipeline. Proven reserves at Shah Deniz considerably exceed the earlier estimates. Turkey's role will change from that of a consumer to that of transit country for Azerbaijani gas;

4) extending the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline into Poland, expanding its projected annual capacity to a commercially more attractive figure than the 9 million tons initially proposed, and ensuring supplies of Kazakhstan oil via the Black Sea to Odessa for this pipeline.

A Black Sea-Caspian focus would highlight the opportunities for common EU-U.S. policies on energy security. The timing seems ideal for the forthcoming EU Green Paper on Energy to recommend joining forces with the United States to reactivate the major projects drafted in the 1990s for direct access via the Black Sea region to Caspian oil and gas. Those are: the EU's Traceca (Transit Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia) project, practically abandoned at inception, and the U.S.-initiated East-West Energy Corridor, which is only materializing from Azerbaijan to Turkey, but stopped short of extending as planned in the 1990s to the far larger eastern-shore reserves in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

In the intervening decade, European and overall Western energy requirements have increased, even as supply risks posed by rogue or war-torn countries -- and, this winter, by an unreliable Russia -- are multiplying. The EU Paper ought to make clear that monopolization of access to Caspian hydrocarbons is unacceptable (a principle that can also form a basis for EU-U.S. policy coordination) and that the EU has legitimate, indeed pressing, interests in obtaining direct access.

Once it defines the main policy goals, the Energy Paper ought to recommend real empowerment of existing EU instruments for implementation: the Energy Commissioner's office, the EU's Special Representatives for the regions, and the EU missions in energy-producing and key transit countries.

Those instruments have long been disabled in the Black Sea and Caspian regions due to the absence of a common energy policy in Brussels. Thus, EU Council spokespersons insisted that Ukraine and Moldova's gas problems with Russia this winter were bilateral issues, seemingly ignoring the adverse impact on EU transit interests. The EU Energy Commissioner inaccurately characterized the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis as a commercial dispute, and described Russia as a reliable long-term supplier even after the second and third rounds of supply shortfalls, caused by never-explained sabotage of three supply lines in the North Caucasus and an ostensibly "unforeseen" deep freeze in Siberia, respectively.

A credible Energy Paper needs to demonstrate that the EU means business in the Black Sea and Caspian regions. Brussels must include energy supply and transit as high priorities in the mandates of its Special Representatives for the South Caucasus and Central Asia and of its missions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. The EU can also propose launching and institutionalizing discussions with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on commercial development of their energy deposits and a European alternative to the Russian monopsony.

The EU also needs to step in with expert assistance to Ukraine and Moldova as these re-negotiate their gas agreements with Russia under pressure. Russia seeks to extend its dominance over gas transit to EU countries by acquiring incremental control over Ukraine's pipeline system and full control over Moldova's, leveraging the supplier's monopoly. Ukraine now apparently wishes to extricate itself from the dangerous five-year agreements it signed in January and February with Gazprom and RosUkrEnergo; while Moldova faces the March 31 expiry of its interim agreement with Gazprom. At Chisinau's initiative, Kyiv and Chisinau jointly requested the EU in January to provide advice on the formation of market prices for gas supplies and transit and to delegate expert observers to the Ukraine-Russia and Moldova-Russia negotiations. The EU missed that unprecedented opportunity in January. It must seize it now.

Preventing a transfer of Ukraine's gas transit pipelines to some form of "joint" Russian-Ukrainian control (as a guise for Russian de facto control) is a major EU interest in Europe's East. Moscow holds out two rationales for such a transfer: price and debt relief, and investment for the pipelines' modernization in Russian co-ownership. Such a transfer would increase Gazprom's market dominance in the EU as a whole and would place Ukraine's immediate neighbors in the EU under pressure to cede portions of their national infrastructure to the monopoly supplier. Meanwhile, Ukrainian authorities' gross mismanagement of gas negotiations with Russia (and of energy policy generally) translates into political and strategic vulnerability of the country, which in turn jeopardizes Western geostrategic interests throughout Europe's East and the Black Sea region.

Before Ukraine's energy predicament deepens any further, the EU can immediately offer to send a task force of experts to Kyiv for an overall assessment of the situation. The assessment process could soon evolve into an EU-Ukraine standing consultative mechanism that could help formulate an energy strategy of Ukraine, map out energy sector reforms, plan the modernization of its aging transit systems for gas and oil to the EU, and consider the formation of a European investment consortium to overhaul those systems as an alternative to a Russian-dominated consortium.



By Vladimir Socor
http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370833

Bosnia and Herzegovina at the crossroads?

he International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses events in the Middle East and the Balkans. Dr. Miro Cerar, professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Ljubljana and adviser on constitutional issues at the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, presents his views of the proposed constitutional amendments which were submitted to the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH for discussion and adoption by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of an agreement concluded by seven political parties (SDS, SDA, HDZ, SDP, SNSD, PDP and HNZ).

Dr. Miro CERAR
- professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana
- adviser on constitutional issues at the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia

An obligation and at the same time an opportunity for a general revision of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina represent a significant political as well as legal (constitutional) challenge for this state. The politicians, legal and other experts as well as the citizens are standing at an important crossroads. One road follows the direction of ensuring the institutions typical of the western-type democracy and, thus, of the constitutionalism and the rule of law, while the other road leads to the institutional preservation of the pre-modern society, i.e. the state where the law and politics are a means of constant ? concealed or open ? fight for the predominance of one ethnic community over another. In more simple terms, the first road leads into (further) implementation of the values and practices which are gaining ground for example in the framework of the European Union, while the second road leads into relative isolation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in the long run, even into its gradual legal (constitutional) and political decay. In the long-run there is in reality no middle road (or it is merely a fictive one) since the civilisational directions of the European and global development as well as the cultural, religious, political, ethnic, geographical and other factors place Bosnia and Herzegovina at a geostrategic turning point where it has to decide in which direction it would go. Looking for the middle road or postponing the decision would actually imply taking the second road. The fact that this time Bosnia and Herzegovina can take a major part of its destiny into its own hands is on one hand an important emancipatory moment in the development of the state and its citizens, but on the other hand it represents a great historical responsibility and puts its political and intellectual elites at a test.

Under such circumstances a fast constitutional discussion which lacks the transparency can be very harmful in the long run. The issues that are concealed in the constitutional debate and resolved "in haste" within a narrow political circle or even by misleading the public have negative repercussions in the future. A (democratic) constitution of a relatively good quality should provide for the values as well as political and legal institutions which comply with the prevailing political and legal consciousness and the desires of the great majority of the citizens. An increasingly heated, critical and polemic debate on the constitutional amendments which is taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina should therefore be understood as a natural and expected (democratic) process in the current situation. What is more, the process can not be stopped by force, or else various political and other players may perceive the constitutional amendments as something that has been imposed on them which is the worst possible farewell to the first independent constitutional project of this young state. Although one can not draw parallels between the EU (and its member states) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (and its "entities"), the failed (or at lease "postponed") project of adopting the "European Constitutional Treaty" (Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe) can, at least on principle, serve as a good example and an indicator of the inefficiency of hastiness in adopting an important constitutional document. Of course, this does not mean that a fruitful constitutional discussion always has to be a long one. What it means is that all the basic contents of the proposed amendments should be examined in the light of the responses of the professional and general public in order to ensure the necessary political and social legitimacy. However, it is of key importance not to deviate from the fundamental (democratic) goals of such constitutional revision.

If the basic aim of constitutional amendments in Bosnia and Herzegovina is (and should be) to increase the democratic standards and, as a result, to access and subsequently join the European Union, the constitutional revision must on one hand ensure a more efficient and democratic functioning of the basic institutions and on the other hand preserve and upgrade the mechanisms for efficient protection of the fundamental human rights and freedoms. If we focus primarily on the first and most topical aspect which includes the constitutional reform of the structure and the functioning of the supreme authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the key question is obviously whether it is possible to ensure further democratisation of the system and at the same time preserve or even strengthen the power of constitutional entities. The answer to that question can only be negative. The entities namely have an excessively disabling effect on the democratic processes which already require a relatively long period to be introduced and established. That does not mean that the entities should be abolished (which would also be completely unrealistic). What is important is that in some key aspects of the functioning of democratic institutions the entities give way to the principle of general representativeness.

Moreover, in case of Bosnia and Herzegovina we are talking about a specific situation in which the principles of democracy (majority decision-making on the basis of the general representativeness principle and the protection of fundamental human rights and the rights of minorities) and efficiency (timely adoption of appropriate decisions with majority support) do not contradict each other, which is, at least to a certain degree and in the short run, a feature of the steady democratic (parliamentary) systems. In the latter system a higher level of democratisation in the form of public and parliamentary discussions etc. at least partly disables the timely adoption of important political and legal decisions (the predominance of the democratic principle is of course more socially accepted in the long run). In case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a higher level of democratisation in the above sense of the word which implies a reduced role of the entities and an increased role of the principle of democratic representativeness in the decision-making at the state level (whereby, of course, human rights and the rights of minorities should be constitutionally and judicially protected) would lead to a much better efficiency of the political and legal (constitutional) system. The entity decision-making is usually incompatible with the modern democratic parliamentarism, except when it is specifically aimed at correcting the general representativeness principle, e.g. in the form of parity or proportional composition of the lower chamber of the parliament. The constitutional question of the entity structure and entity principle of decision-making within the highest national bodies (especially the Parliamentary Assembly) is of key importance for Bosnia and Herzegovina and for its existence as a uniform and sovereign state.

Although the proposed amendments to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina bring some democratic and productive solutions for the development, their value is only relative and to a great extent completely diminished when taking into account the fact that under those amendments the adoption of the decisions by the House of Representatives which usually decides on the most important national issues (Amendment II, Article IV, paragraph 7) would be completely blocked with a veto imposed by the entities. This possibility is especially enabled by the provision according to which the House of Representatives can not adopt a decision if at least two thirds of the members selected from each entity vote against it. (Amendment II, Article IV, paragraph 9/e). That and some other provisions (e.g. on the presidency elections ? Amendment III, Article V, paragraph 2) only further confirm the fact that the amendments lay down the entity decision-making in the Parliamentary Assembly which means that the ethnic and national principle may prevail over the principle of democratic representativeness. Moreover, with the parity entity composition of the House of Nations (which would be an acceptable solution in itself, but in combination with the entity principle in the Parliamentary Assembly it means a model which is incompatible with the modern democracy), and especially with the right of the constitutive nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina to veto in order to protect the vital national interests (in which case the Constitutional Court is appropriately envisaged to decide on the justifiability of the veto used to assert such interests) it becomes clear that such constitutional amendments contain several impediments and limitations and as such do not enable the achievement of the goals they are supposed to achieve (i.e. higher level of democratisation, tolerance, stability and efficiency of the system etc.).

Without dealing with other aspects of the proposed constitutional amendments which also include some constructive solutions, it can be concluded that it would be reasonable to continue the constitutional debate in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to reconsider the proposed solutions. Such reflection should be conditional on a more clear position on what is the real goal of the constitutional amendments. Is it a modern, emancipated, democratic and legal state with the relatively efficiently functioning institutional system, or further weakening and division of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which the ethnic and other specific players and factors dominate at the detriment of the efficiency of the whole? Hopefully that question is merely rhetoric, since in our opinion there is no middle or "third" possibility.

Ljubljana, 25 April 2006

Internationale Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) ? Ljubljana

Director:
Bakhtyar Aljaf

written by: Dr. Miro Cerar
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=12853&topicID=32

Developing a New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region: Istanbul Paper #2

Foreward

The idea for this strategy paper grew out of a conversation with Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana in the spring of 2003. The Prague NATO summit had taken place a few months earlier and Alliance leaders had embraced the idea of a ?Big Bang? enlargement involving seven countries stretching from the three Baltic states in the north to Romania and Bulgaria on the Black Sea in the south. In parallel, the European Union was preparing for an equally historic and ambitious round of enlargement that would encompass ten countries. It was the fulfillment of a dream that emerged a decade earlier when the leaders of new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe had set their sights on anchoring themselves to the West by becoming full members of the Euro-Atlantic community and joining both the EU and NATO.

What was next? Was the vision of Europe ?whole and free? now complete? Was it time for the West, and the EU in particular, to ?pause? and consolidate itself? Or should it now turn its attention to those young and fragile democracies lying further East and reach out to help them anchor themselves in the Euro-Atlantic community as well? How serious was a country like Ukraine about transforming itself into a credible Western partner and possible future ally? With Romania and Bulgaria joining Alliance and eventually the European Union, as well as the prospect of longstanding NATO ally Turkey becoming a member of the EU as well, was it time to think about developing a Western outreach strategy for the wider Black Sea region?

We debated the moral and political responsibility of the United State and Europe in general, and the specific especially of those Central and East European countries now entering the EU and NATO, to help the West think through these issues. Foreign Minister Geoana made an eloquent and persuasive case that his generation of leaders from Central and Eastern Europe had a unique chance and responsibility to help ensure that Euro-Atlantic integration was not artificially halted and that these countries were not forgotten. Although the ?revolution of roses? in Georgia had not yet taken place, he underscored that there was a new generation of leaders emerging in the region who shared western values and aspirations and that it was time for the West to develop a strategy to work with them.

Inspired by this and subsequent conversations that also included senior Bulgarian officials, GMF decided that there was a critical need to form a working group of both scholars and practitioners from across Europe and the region to brainstorm about such a strategy. The goal was to try to sketch out the contours of what a bold and ambitious approach to help anchor the countries of the Black Sea region to the West could and should look like. From the outset, we were joined by the Romanian and Bulgarian Ministries of Foreign Affairs as key partners as well as some of GMF?s key NGO partners in those two countries.

Brainstorming sessions were held in the fall of 2003 and spring of 2004. The first was held in Bucharest in November 2003 in cooperation with the Romanian Academic Society and the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A second seminar was held in Sofia in early February 2004 jointly with the Institute for Regional and International Studies, the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria and the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Security as well as the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense. A third and final session was held in Bratislava, hosted by the Bratislava Office of GMF together with the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The participants in the project are listed at the end of this report. They were drawn from both sides of the Atlantic as well as the wider Black sea region and reflect a diversity of backgrounds and experiences. They came from the world of NGO?s and think tanks as well as the corridors of politics and diplomacy. They participated in their private capacities as thinkers and individuals who care deeply about the issues debated in this report. Their institutional affiliations are for identification purposes only.While the report reflects and draws on many of the views expressed, they were not asked to sign this report.

The results are contained in this Report of the working group. It seeks to lay out a rationale for why the United States and Europe need to pay more attention to the wider Black Sea region. It attempts to capture the center of gravity of these discussions and sketch out a strategic framework for new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the region.While it is authored by Ronald Asmus who served as the Director of this project, it reflects the thinking of the working group and is an attempt to summarize the discussions that took place. In parallel to this report, GMF is also publishing a separate book entitled ?A New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region? which contains a number of the brainstorming essays written for these meetings. In many cases, the arguments presented in this paper are developed in further detail there. Together these publications provide a comprehensive overview of the work undertaken.We hope that they will also spark further thought and debate on a future strategy toward the wider Black Sea region.

Craig Kennedy

President

The German Marshall Fund of the United States


Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Setting Western Goals
  3. A New Outreach Strategy for the EU and NATO
  4. Frozen Conflicts, Russia and Regional Cooperation
  5. Conclusion
    Participants of the Working Group


I. Introduction

A series of historically unprecedented events have brought the attention of the West to the wider Black Sea region?that area including the littoral states of the Black Sea, Moldova, and the Southern Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. An area that has heretofore been neglected by the Euro-Atlantic community is now starting to move from the periphery to the center of Western attention.

Why has the West heretofore lacked such a strategy for the Black Sea region in the past and what has changed to make one so critical now? Four main factors explain the past lack of interest.

First, in many ways the Black Sea region has been the Bermuda Triangle of Western strategic studies in recent decades. Lying at the crossroads of European, Eurasian, and Middle Eastern security spaces, it has been largely ignored by mainstream experts in each of these faculties. Geographically located at the edge of each region, the Black Sea has not been at the center of attention of any of them.When it came to Europe, our priority was with the arc of countries extending from the Baltic to the Balkan states.When it came to the former Soviet Union, we were focused on building a new cooperative relationship with Moscow. And apart from the Israeli-Arab conflict, the attention of western Middle Eastern policy usually ceased at Turkey?s southern border.

www.sofia.bg
The Statue of Sofia, patron of Sofia city.
Second, given the crowded agenda of the Euro-Atlantic community since the collapse of communism 15 years ago, there was little time or political energy left to address the Black Sea region. The task of anchoring and integrating Central and Eastern Europe, stopping the Balkan wars, and putting those countries back on a path towards European integration?and, finally, trying to establish a new and cooperative post-Cold War relationship with Moscow?were full-time preoccupations. If one looked at the list of priorities of an American Secretary of State or European foreign minister in the 1990?s, rightly or wrongly, the Black Sea rarely broke through into the top tier of concerns. The exception was, of course, Turkey, which fought a lonely political battle to get the West to pay more attention to the region. Almost by default, our considerable interest in the safe and stable flow of energy through the region ended up driving our policy?as opposed to some overarching vision of the place of these countries in the Euro-Atlantic community.

Third, at that time there was also little push from the region for a closer relationship with the West. No Lech Walesa or Vaclav Havel emerged in the 1990s to capture our attention or pound at our door. The countries of the region, different and with widely varying aspirations, were preoccupied with their own problems and at times engaged in civil war and their own armed conflicts. Any thought of joining the West in the foreseeable future seemed unrealistic or even utopian ? in their eyes as well as ours. In the West, there is always a tendency to ignore or neglect problems for which one has no immediate answer or prospect for success: the ?too hard to handle? category. Henry Kissinger is reported to have said that a secretary of state should not tackle an issue without at least a 90 percent likelihood of success. The problems of the wider Black Sea region were often seen as failing to meet that standard.

Fourth, the Black Sea has been a kind of civilizational black hole in the Western historical consciousness. We suffer not only from a lack of familiarity with the region, its people, its problems, its rich culture, and its contribution to the spread of Western civilization, but also from a kind of historical amnesia. For some, ?Europe? meant Western Europe; for others, it extended to the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea ? but in the case of the latter, only to its western and southern edges. For many in the West, Ukraine and the Southern Caucasus still seem far-away lands of which we knew little and, rightly or wrongly, care less. Others are still too afraid to even think about venturing into what Moscow today claims to be its ?near abroad? and natural sphere of influence if not domination ? not realizing or recognizing the many of the deepest roots of what is now consider Western and European civilization can be traced back to the cultures and countries that lived on the Black Sea throughout history.

After largely ignoring the region for the past decade, however, the West is now starting to wake up to the growing importance of the wider Black Sea region and the need for a modern and updated strategy. Several factors are propelling both the United States and Europe to focus their attention on this region and to develop a new and more coherent strategic framework.

The first of these factors is the successful integration of Central and Eastern European countries stretching from the three Baltic states in the north to Romania and Bulgaria on the Western shores of the Black Sea in the south into NATO. This has been matched by parallel and historic expansion of the European Union to ten new members as well. The dual enlargement of the EU and NATO to Central and Eastern Europe conclude the grand project of the 1990?s - to try to make Europe?s eastern half as democratic, prosperous and secure as the continent?s western half.

Strategically, this means that the age-old security problem of the future of those lands lying between Germany and Russia has been resolved through the anchoring and integration of these countries to the West. Germany is firmly embedded in both European and transatlantic structures; and both the EU and NATO have new mechanisms to manage relations with Russia. Thus, the questions that have been at the heart of European security and preoccupied our leaders and strategists for the last century are increasingly resolved. At the same time, the Euro-Atlantic community now must face the question whether and how to reach out to the new democracies lying further to the east and south and help anchor them to this enlarged European and trans-Atlantic framework.

Second, there are also new and more credible voices in theses countries articulating their aspirations to anchor themselves and become full members of Euroatlantic institutions. The success of the ?Big Bang? enlargement has nurtured hopes in these countries that they, too, can dare to think big and succeed. Three of the countries of the region ? Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey ? are in NATO and another three ? Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan ? have declared their desire to join. The emergence of new reformist leaders in the region has given the West new partners to work with. Georgia?s ?revolution of roses? has played a particularly important role in demonstrating the will to embrace the radical reforms needed. For the first time there is a country that is matching those aspirations with concrete steps and moving to become a viable candidate for eventual membership into Euro-Atlantic institutions. A visitor to Tbilisi, Georgia today can discover the same kind of determination to take their countries to the West that existed a decade ago in the Baltic states.

Third, the strategic optic of the West has changed in a way that potentially puts this region front and center in our thinking. The terrorist attacks against the United States, Europe and Turkey have served to underscore the new dangers and strategic realities facing our societies in the 21st century. They have highlighted the fact that many of the greatest threats to North America and Europe are now likely to emanate from beyond the continent as opposed to from within in or from Eurasia. In particular, they are centered in the wider Middle East, that region stretching from Morocco to Afghanistan. In addition to providing a critical portion of the world?s energy needs, the wider Middle East is the most likely place for the dangerous combination of totalitarian ideologies, state failure, terrorism and access to weapons of mass destruction to occur.

The wider Black Sea region is the Euroatlantic community?s great eastern frontier with the wider Middle East. And these countries are a natural partner in any Western strategy dealing with the wider Middle East. They, too, are interested in the progressive transformation of this neighboring region into more free, democratic and stable societies. For the West, the significance of the Black Sea countries and goes well beyond military planning factors, boots on the grounds or even forward bases. Anchoring them to the West and helping to ensure their political and economic stability is critical to our capability of projecting soft power into the broader Middle East as well. A western success in this region can help and teach us many lessons in how to handle the daunting problems of reform and modernization in the wider Middle East.

Last but certainly not least, there is the energy factor.Why should the Euro-Atlantic community be concerned with energy issues in the Black Sea region? In the changed global market after September 2001, the answer is simple: the United States and the Europe share an interest in diversifying their energy supplies away from reliance on Saudi Arabian and Persian Gulf oil. The Black Sea is poised to become a much more important conduit for non-OPEC, non-Gulf oil and natural gas can flow into European markets and beyond. The potential of these sources is considerable. Russia is an energy supplier of growing importance, while Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have significant oil reserves as well. As most of this oil will reach European markets after transiting the Black Sea region, integration of this area into the broader European security and economic environment is important for the long-term energy security strategy of EU and NATO members.

These factors are combining to change the Western optic of the wider Black sea region and to elevate it on the list of Euroatlantic priorities. The countries in the region were previously seen as on the periphery of Europe at a time when the main challenges in European security were focused on the North Central European plain and our relations with Russia. September 11th, Afghanistan and Iraq have made this entire region a focal point of a Western strategic reassessment.With NATO is engaged in Afghanistan, the U.S. and its allies are peacekeeping in Iraq and with Iran one of the top strategic challenges facing the West, the wider Black Sea region is taking on a new significance. It is not only the new borderlands of the Euroatlantic community but part of a strategic space reaching as far as the Persian Gulf that is likely to draw the attention of NATO and the EU and other regional actors in the decades ahead.

The growing recognition that the wider Black Sea region needs to be at the forefront of the Euro-Atlantic agenda has not yet been translated into a coherent strategic rationale and strategy attractive and comprehensible to elites and publics on both sides of the Atlantic.Without such a rationale, however, Europe and the United States will not able to generate the attention, focus and resources necessary to engage and anchor the countries of the wider Black Sea region to the West, let alone help them transform themselves into full partners and perhaps, over time, full members of the major Euro-Atlantic institutions. That is what now needs to happen.


II. Setting Western Goals

A new Euroatlantic strategy for the wider Black Sea region must start with a discussion of what American and European goals in this region should be. For the reasons laid out above, there is a strong case ? moral, political, economic and strategic ? for elevating the region as a higher priority on the Euro-Atlantic community?s agenda and developing a bolder and more ambitious outreach strategy. But what should the ultimate goal of that strategy and effort be? What are the aspirations of the different countries in the region? How do American and Europeans see their objectives? Is the purpose of such a strategy to simply strengthen these countries internally and to pull them and this region closer to the EU and NATO through expanded cooperation ? a looser form of anchoring but with no perspective of eventual membership in our institution? Or should we set the goal even higher ? i.e., to not only anchor but to actually transform and integrate this region to the West in a manner similar to what has accomplished for Central and Eastern Europe? Over what timeframe are these goals feasible if at all?

Even raising the issue of the eventual membership of these countries in Euroatlantic institutions, or drawing a parallel between Central and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region, is highly controversial in many corners of both the EU and NATO today. Having just completed a major round of enlargement of membership, many in both institutions are loath to talk or even think about any future enlargement at all. The EU has just resolved a messy constitutional debate and is still groping to understand how this new enlarged institution will function in practice. NATO must deal with the capabilities gap across the Atlantic and among its European members as well as prepare for very different future missions. In both institutions, ?enlargement fatigue? has set in and there are real concerns about their future cohesion and effectiveness.

Bucharest, The Parliament Palace, world's second largest building. "House of the People"
Moreover, the sense of historical connection and solidarity between the United States and Europe on the one hand and the wider Black Sea region on the other is more tenuous.While the countries of the region certainly consider themselves to be European, those feelings are not always reciprocated. The distance between London, Paris and Berlin and Kyiv, Tbilisi and Baku today is not only geographic.Many officials in Brussels and elsewhere question whether these countries are truly European, whether they fully understand what membership entail and whether these countries are capable of ever meeting those standards.When Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians or Azeris talk about joining Europe and the Euroatlantic community, not everyone today takes such talk all that seriously.

The question of membership for any of these countries is also premature in any operational sense, at least for the immediate future. Not only is the West today unable to provide a clear perspective, but the countries we are talking about ? Ukraine, Moldova or Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia ? are themselves weaker, poorer and less developed than previous candidates. They have a steeper hill to climb than their Central and Eastern European brethren did a decade ago. In some ways they may be more comparable to some of the countries in the Balkans as opposed to Central and Eastern Europe. None of the countries in the wider Black Sea region today has advanced far enough to make a credible case for meeting the qualifications required for either institution.

Last but not least, the question of Russia ? the biggest and most powerful Black Sea littoral state ? and its views and possible objections to the integration of these countries into Western structures looms even larger than it did with previous rounds of enlargement given that country?s proximity and neuralgia about this region, a subject we will return to later in this paper.

It was once said that the West?s successful strategy for Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s was based on three ingredients: the creation of a big juicy carrot or incentive in the form of a clear perspective of eventual membership for these countries; the motivation and drive to go West and the willingness to implement difficult reforms that leaders in these countries brought to the table; and a strategy to find a new modus vivendi with Russia that defused the danger of a train wreck between the West and Moscow. If one applies that framework, to the wider Black Sea region, it is obvious that the point of departure today is more difficult. The carrot is smaller; the drive to reform and go West is weaker and the Russian factor looms larger.

Acknowledging these realities, however, in no way obviates the need for a new Euro-Atlantic strategy. Indeed, it strengthens the case for the kind of comprehensive and long-term outreach strategy that can, over time, alter these realities. This would include the creation of a new Western vision that embraces these countries and gives them the perspective they need; policies and support that can help them reform and transform themselves countries into the kinds of societies that can become viable candidates and a new approach toward Russia that transcends old geopolitical habits and patterns.

One also needs a sense of perspective.When listening to the arguments today why the integration of Black Sea countries is not feasible, one cannot escape a sense of de ja vu. In the early 1990s, the idea of Central and East European countries joining the EU or NATO also initially evoked fierce opposition. Former French President Francois Mitterrand, for example, initially declared that it would be ?decades and decades? before these countries could join the EU. Opposition to enlarging NATO was just as strong. And no where was it stronger than in the bureaucracies of these institutions themselves. The first wave of Western outreach proposals all insisted that membership was not on the agenda and offered to create some interim status to pacify these countries.

Those policies and the mindset behind them did not stand the test of time. They were increasingly recognized as inadequate. Policies designed to keep countries out of institutions were transformed into way stations for eventually getting them in.What initially seemed impossible gradually became possible and today in accepted conventional wisdom.What changed this equation were three factors.

The first was the push from the region and in particular the appeal from new democratic leaders who were boldly reforming their countries and societies.When they turned to the West and asked for help in consolidating the same values the Euroatlantic community is committed to building and defending,Western leaders decided they had to respond to a historical imperative ? often over the strong objection of many in bureaucracy. Those appeals would not have been credible or gained political traction, however, if they were not backed up by performance and reforms on the ground. One can see the same process starting today in the significant political and psychological impact that Georgia?s ?revolution of roses? and President Mikhail Saakashvili have had in nudging Western policy forward toward greater support and engagement with Tbilisi and the region.

A second factor that changed Western thinking in the 1990s was the strategic insight ? reinforced by the bloodshed and horror of ethnic wars of the Balkans ? that the West was better off acting preventively to stabilize and integrate Central and Eastern Europe and locking in stability in advance than running the risk of new instability emerging at some point down the road. It has often been said that NATO and EU enlargement were one giant act of conflict prevention. In the case of the wider Black Sea region, it is precisely this question that the September 11th, Afghanistan, Iraq and the instability of the broader Middle East have raised in a very different context. Are we not better off today in assertively moving to help consolidate democracy and stability in this region bordering on the wider Middle East rather than running the risk of that instability from that region spreads into the Euro-Atlantic community?

A third factor that changed Western thinking in the 1990s ? and which also has a parallel in the current situation ? is Europe?s very understanding and definition of itself. The collapse of communism and the USSR in 1989 and 1991 was unexpected. So were the early demands from new democratic leaders in what was then still called Eastern Europe to join the EU and NATO. Such demands challenged and in many ways threatened the then prevailing view in Europe of itself which was essentially defined in ?West European? terms. But those demands from the East helped set into motion a rediscovery of an old part of Europe that the Cold War had artificially cut off. It led eventually to a redefinition of Europe that came to embrace those countries in the East stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

That redefinition has found two expressions, cultural and institutional. Culturally, it now seems very old-fashioned to talk about ?Western Europe? and ?Eastern Europe.? The notion of ?Europe? clearly includes Central and Eastern Europe. The notion of ?Eastern Europe,? if used at all, now encompass Ukraine and Belarus as opposed to Poland or the Czech lands. Today the next step in again redefining ?Europe? is being played out in the debate over whether Turkey should be invited to join the EU.

And if Ankara is invited to start accession talks and successfully completes them, then one must ask whether a Europe that includes Turkey would say no to Ukrainian aspirations, especially if Kyiv were to get serious about reform and democratization. Is it not possible to imagine another redefinition of our understanding of ?Europe? unfolding over the next decade or so in which the inclusion of Turkey, Ukraine and the Southern Caucasus gradually becomes increasingly natural? Might not our current sense of Europe?s limits also seem quite artificial in a decade or so?

The same is true institutionally. The EU and NATO were incapable of adapting and enlarging to new members when those demands were first raised in the early 1990s. But those institutions, too, were driven to adapt to the political and strategic imperatives of a new era. And the reality is that they reinvented themselves in order to be able to enlarge. These institutions are dynamic, not static. The EU today in its current form probably cannot handle Turkey as a new member ? let alone Ukraine or the Southern Caucasus. But if the EU decides to enlarge to Turkey, it will have to adapt to meet that challenge, too. It is not today?s EU that will do that, but a reformed institution that has change in order to cope with that challenge. And the same is likely to be true for NATO. As it becomes increasingly involved in regions and missions the founding fathers never conceived of, it will have to reinvent itself yet again to meet new challenges, including new members.

This as a rather long-winded way of appealing for a bit more historic openness and humility when it comes to what is possible over the next decade or two ? both in terms of what the countries in the region are capable of becoming as well as the capacity of our own institutions to adapt to new imperatives and strategic circumstances. As Chou En-lai is reported to have responded when asked about his assessment of the French Revolution, it may be too early to tell. The same is true when it comes to what the final place in and the relationship of these countries with the Euroatlantic community will or should be. If the countries of the region succeed in reforming themselves to the point where they qualify for membership, it would be a remarkable success. The problems that would pose are the challenges of success. They are preferable to deal with than the challenges of failure.


To see the full strategy paper in PDF format click
here.



V. Conclusion

Developing a new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region must start with the major democracies of North America and Europe recognizing their own moral and strategic stake in the region. Projecting stability and security in these countries is not only the next logical step in building a Europe whole and free, but the wider Black Sea region is the Euroatlantic community?s eastern frontier with the wider Middle East. In spite of the many differences, locking in reform and stability in this region may be as important over the next decade as integrating Central and Eastern Europe into the West was for the previous 1990s.

The European Union has already taken a small but important step by including the South Caucasus in Europe?s Neighborhood Policy, informally known as Wider Europe. It is time for NATO to take a parallel step at its Istanbul summit by recognizing the strategic stake it has in this region. Such recognition should be matched by a bold program of outreach and both bilateral and regional cooperation. Anchoring these countries to the West will not be easy or happen overnight. Whether the end result is simple better relations or the full integration of these countries into institutions like the EU and NATO remains to be seen. Once again the West faces the challenge of either working with these countries to export stability or running the risk it will important instability from the area down the road.

As in the past, developing a new Euroatlantic strategy to meet this challenge will require the leadership of a core group of countries on both sides of the Atlantic to help set a new course. Large institutions like the EU or NATO operate by consensus and move slowly and deliberately. To use a shipping parallel, it often takes time to turn the bow of the tanker in a new strategic direction. As was the case with Central and Eastern Europe, a coalition of Western countries can organize themselves to take the lead in working with these countries on both a bilateral and multilateral basis ? and pull the institutions as a whole behind them. The tools and experience to reach out to these countries already exist.What are needed are the political will and the guidance to tailor such programs to their specific interests and needs.

Finally, North America and Europe, working through the OSCE and the United Nations, must step up to the plate and make a concerted effort to resolve the frozen conflicts from Transneistria to Nagorno-Karabakh that continue to plague the region. The persistence of conflict and occupying forces are destructive cancers eating away at the fabrics of society in this region. In place of economic development, they create criminal enterprise and trafficking. In place of regional security cooperation, they foster the proliferation of arms and a climate of intimidation. Fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time to make their resolution a top priority, including in our relations with Moscow.

The final and most important factor shaping a new Euroatlantic outreach strategy is the countries of the region themselves. The history of the last decade shows that the West often moves in response to the actions of the countries themselves. Had they not undertaken ?shock therapy? and far-reaching reforms on their own, Central and East European countries today might still be stuck in some vague EU associate status or a version of PfP designed as an alternative to NATO membership. And if the countries around the Black Sea region stay on the stagnant path many of them have been on for the past decade, then the EU?s New Neighborhood framework or NATO?s PAP and IPAP won?t make much difference. The onus for change is on the aspirants to make the first serious and palpable reforms, not the other way around.

It is worthwhile to recall the experience of the Baltic states in this regard. They were arguably at a comparable level of development as Georgia and other countries in the wider Black Sea region when the USSR broke up. They, too, carried the cross of being a ?former Soviet Republic.? They were initially rejected when they first asked the EU to provide a perspective for membership and their NATO aspirations were also deemed ?unrealistic.? Although they started two years later than the Visegrad countries and from a lower economic base, they embarked on a rigorous set of reforms which within five years allowed them to catch up with the front runners in Central and Eastern Europe as candidates.When one Baltic country started to pull ahead of the other two countries, the others redouble their efforts lest the EU enlarge to one instead of all three states. Their example shows that nothing is pre-ordained, that performance matters and small counties in Europe can determine their own fate after all.

But the West can both assist in that process as well as help create the foreign policy environment that reinforces such trends and helps put and keep these countries on a path that will bring them closer to the West. In doing so, we would lay the foundation for the third phase in completing the vision of a wider Europe. The first phase of enlargement focused on the anchoring of Poland and the Visegrad countries. The second phase broadened that vision to include the new democracies from the Baltic to the Western edge of the Black Sea. Today the challenge is to extend that vision to potentially include the countries of the wiser Black Sea region as well.

The completion of this third phase would be a tremendous advance for the cause of democracy, integration and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. It would also better position the United States and Europe to deal with the challenges of the broader Middle East. The key question is not whether it is desirable but whether it is achievable. That is the challenge we now must face.

written by: Ronald Asmus (Ron Asmus - member of the WSN International Advisory Board)

Why Black Boats Got the Blues?

March 27, 2006: The Royal Navy, after extensive research, has concluded that submarines should be painted a shade of deep blue, rather than black, to protect them from detection while surfaced. Subs have been painted black, or some form of camouflage pattern, for over a century. But, as with many other color schemes in the past, close examination usually reveals ways to do it.

Actually, the paint job on a submarine has very little to do with its chances of being spotted. Nuclear subs (Britain only has nuclear subs) are under water nearly all the time they are at work. The only time they surface is, sometimes, when sending commandos ashore, or picking them up. Many subs can do this while still submerged. These command operations usually take place at night, when black paint does the concealment job quite well. What the British camouflage experts discovered was that, during the day, or in overcast weather, black was much less effective at concealing a surfaced sub than was the new shade of dark blue.

Even diesel-electric subs, which spend most of their time on, or near, the surface, don't depend all that much on their paint job. Radar and sonar are more likely, than an eyeball, to detect a surfaced sub. Not only that, most diesel-electric subs have a schnorkel device, which enables the sub to stay beneath the surface, with only the washing machine sized schnorkel be above the water, to get air into the sub, for the crew and its diesel engines.

The new color does provide better concealment in tropical waters, that are "brighter" than the cooler north Atlantic and Arctic waters that have been the scene of most submarine operations over the past century. Currently, subs are more likely to be roaming warmer waters.

If anything, the new British innovations hurts them, more than it helps them. Navies that have lots of diesel-electric boats will now repaint them this more effective color, making it more difficult for the British to detect them.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsub/articles/20060327.aspx

Salı, Nisan 25, 2006

Off Autopilot: The future of Turkish-US relations (I)

IAN O. LESSER

TDN Guest Writer

For decades, the relationship between Ankara and Washington has been described as strategic -- durable and supportive of the most important international objectives of both sides, especially in security terms. Today, the strategic quality of the relationship can no longer be taken for granted as a result of divergent perceptions of the Iraq war, and more importantly, changing foreign policy debates in both countries. As a result, a bilateral relationship of great geopolitical significance, but one that has operated largely on autopilot since the early years of the Cold War, is now in question. A reinvigorated strategic relationship will be in the interest of both countries, but is likely to have quite different contours.

To be sure, disagreements in the bilateral relationship between Turkey and the United States are nothing new. The Johnson Letter and the arms embargo following the 1974 Cyprus crisis were only the most striking examples of periodic friction between successive Turkish and American administrations, even against a background of shared strategic purpose. For decades, the need to contain Soviet power shaped the relationship, and set expectations about what Washington and Ankara could offer in security terms. The potential demands on the relationship were substantial, including the use of Turkish territory for nuclear strikes against targets in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the U.S. might have been required to risk nuclear retaliation against its own territory in defense of Turkey. In retrospect, these contingencies seem highly improbable, but they were not seen as remote or inconceivable even as late as the 1980s.

In the Cold War period, the strategic relationship appeared solid because it was never really tested in terms of mutual defense. It was only later, with the Gulf War of 1990, that Turkey was called upon to provide extensive support for coalition operations (Turkey's own requests for air defense reinforcements from NATO were met only after substantial delay -- an experience that still influences Turkish thinking about the country's collective defense arrangements). Turkey's forward leaning stance in the Gulf War left important and somewhat divergent lessons for both sides. In the U.S., the experience of 1990-91 reinforced the image of Turkey as a strategic ally, at the forefront of new security challenges emanating from the Middle East, an impression Turkish policy makers have sought to reinforce with American policy audiences.

In Turkey, by contrast, the first Iraq conflict and the experience of operations Provide Comfort and Northern Watch, are widely viewed as the place where the "trouble" started, with trouble defined as the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) insurgency, more complicated relations with Syria and Iran, and more contentious relations with Washington. It is worth recalling that the years following the first war with Iraq were characterized by frequent bilateral disagreements, over the conduct of counter-PKK operations in southeastern Anatolia and northern Iraq, but also over Turkish and Greek policy in the Aegean. In the mid 1990s, many Turks came to see the United States as a less-than-reliable ally, and some Americans came to see Turkey as part ally, part rogue state. In this climate of mistrust, which was also part of the equation in Turkey-EU relations, it is not surprising that Ankara sought to develop strategic alternatives, including a deeper defense relationship with Israel.

Even in the post-Cold War period, when the geopolitical containment of Soviet power was no longer a driver of security policy, both Ankara and Washington have persisted in seeing Turkey's geographic position as the basis for Turkey's strategic importance, and, ultimately, as the center of gravity for bilateral cooperation. Turkey's proximity to areas of interest and crisis -- in the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Middle East, has made questions of access -- for the projection of military power, or the transportation of energy -- the center of gravity for strategic cooperation with Ankara. This realtor's view of strategy -- ?location, location, location? -- has not served either side well in a post-containment era of diffuse regional problems, less than existential threats, and new debates about national power and purpose on both sides of the Atlantic.



A different Turkey:

Domestic developments and changing national perceptions are part of the equation on both sides. In Turkey, several factors have driven policymakers and the public toward a more wary and ambivalent approach to bilateral relations. Some of these factors may be transitory, others are almost certainly structural.

First, the accelerated pace of Turkish-EU relations has changed the foreign policy debate in ways that inevitably affect relations with the U.S. Regardless of the actual outlook for Turkish membership, a path fraught with pitfalls but also many opportunities over the next decade or more, the process of continued Turkish convergence with European practices and institutions is likely to continue. This process of convergence is, ultimately, what counts for Europe and the United States, and quite possibly for Turks as well.

The U.S. has been a consistent champion of Turkey in Europe, even if Washington's ability to push Turkey's case (and the need to do so) has declined steadily since the Helsinki Summit. Now that Turkey is launched on the path of accession, however uncertain, policymakers on all sides will need to ask more serious questions about the implications for U.S.-Turkish relations over the next decade. Some Europeans may persist in their fear that Turkey within the EU will serve as a ?Trojan Horse? for American foreign policy preferences. In reality, closer Turkey-EU relations will almost certainly pose a greater challenge of adjustment for Washington. Turkish policy is already within the European mainstream, and far closer to European than American approaches on a range of key issues, not least Iran, Iraq and the Middle East peace process. This essentially European orientation extends to contentious global issues, including the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto protocols on climate change.

Even if Turkey's candidacy stalls, or proves hollow over the coming years, the result is unlikely to be closer ties with Washington. Under conditions of estrangement from Europe, Turkish opinion could well shift in the direction of a more sovereignty conscious, nationalistic posture, a development that would complicate relations with Washington as much as Brussels. Only against a background of vastly heightened regional risk, against which American deterrence and reassurance would be essential, would a return to closer strategic cooperation with the U.S. be the natural outcome. Scenarios that could trigger this response include renewed competition with a more assertive Russia, or friction with a nuclear-armed Iran. If Turkey's candidacy proceeds apace and the process of Europeanization continues, this could encourage a useful diversification and deepening of Turkish-U.S. ties, especially on the economic front. Under this scenario, movement toward Europe can have a multiplier effect on trade and investment links to the U.S. This effect could also be felt in the political and security realm, but only if transatlantic relations as a whole develop positively.

Second, new regional dynamics have complicated cooperation. America's intervention on Turkey's Middle Eastern borders has given the question of bilateral relations a much sharper edge. The Iraq war touches on the most sensitive problems affecting Turkish society and politics, above all, the issue of Kurdish identity within Turkey and across the region. The AKP government may have encouraged a more open and active debate on the Kurdish issue, but it remains a flashpoint across the political spectrum. Experience since 1990 has reinforced the impression that developments in Iraq (as well as Syria and Iran) are intimately linked to Turkey's own internal security. The recent revival of the PKK insurgency has only underscored the significance of developments in this area, and revived fears of western -- and especially American -- encouragement for Kurdish nationalism in northern Iraq, and potentially inside Turkey. Ankara very nearly came to blows with Syria over its support for the PKK in 1998, and Turkey has intervened in northern Iraq as part of its cross-border counter-insurgency strategy. In short, the Kurdish-Iraqi equation is the most troubled dimension of the country's external policy, and one subject to historic sensitivities at the public and elite levels.[1] In the wake of the Iraq War, it has also become the focal point for bilateral engagement -- and friction -- with Washington.[2]

To be sure, many Turks misjudge American strategy and intentions with regard to Kurdish separatism and Iraq. Successive American administrations have made clear that the United States does not favor a break-up of Iraq, or an independent Kurdish state, and certainly not one that might threaten the integrity and security of a NATO ally. Repeated assurances on this score have done little to reduce the now widespread Turkish suspicion regarding American policy in northern Iraq. The most tangible demonstration of American commitment to the policy of a united Iraq and a secure Turkey would be concerted action against PKK bases and cells in the region. Many American strategists would favor this. But with immense demands on American attention and resources elsewhere in a still highly unstable Iraq, few policymakers will be enthusiastic about opening new fronts inside the country, especially in a region that appears relatively secure from the vantage point of Washington. As a result, American policymakers have been unable to act in the one area that might reassure Turks about the direction of U.S. policy.

Beyond Iraq, Turkey under the Erdoğan government has pursued a policy of more active engagement in the Middle East, even as relations with Europe have taken center stage. This is not to say that Turkey has overcome its traditional ambivalence regarding relations with Middle Eastern neighbors. Few Turks would seriously argue that ties to the south and east represent a real economic and foreign policy alternative to relations with the West. But the two can certainly coexist as areas for Turkish external engagement, and the AKP government seems inclined to test this proposition to a far greater extent than its predecessors. High level discussions with Syrian and Iranian policymakers, and some high-profile visits and cooperation agreements point in this direction, at a time when U.S. -- and European -- policy toward both Damascus and Tehran is becoming more assertive.

Third, public opinion now counts in Turkish foreign policymaking, and as polling results suggest, this opinion has turned distinctly anti-American in recent years. Recent surveys indicate that Turkish public attitudes toward the United States are now the most negative in Europe.[3] This marked deterioration in perceptions of the United States has special significance for relations between the Erdoğan and Bush administrations. Here, an avowedly populist government in Ankara must deal with a more active and interventionist leadership in Washington, one that confronts Turkey with multiple policy dilemmas in its neighborhood. It is a challenging mixture, and one that is not, of course, unique to Turkish-American relations. Indeed, Turkish public opinion, sensitive to both European and Muslim concerns (e.g., Palestinian aspirations), has multiple sources of pressure when it comes to attitudes toward the U.S. To this must be added the tendency of some American foreign and security policy elites to ignore the changes that have taken place on the Turkish scene over the last decade, in particular the greatly increased role of public opinion and the emergence of new actors in the Turkish policy debate. In this as in several other key areas, relations have remained on autopilot, with only limited attempts to engage new constituencies beyond traditional bilateral partners on the Turkish side. Indeed, even the traditional partners, such as the Turkish military and security establishment, appear ambivalent regarding strategic cooperation with the United States (this was also the case in the early 1990s).

The trend toward strongly negative attitudes about the United States might be reversed, or at least offset, by new policy initiatives seen as favorable to Turkish interests, most notably on the issue of the PKK presence in northern Iraq, or on Cyprus, although the latter is increasingly seen as an area for European initiative by Washington.[4] So too, an overall improvement in transatlantic relations and perceptions of the United States would probably have an effect on public attitudes in Turkey. Yet, without change in these areas, the state of Turkish public opinion will continue to limit the scope for bilateral cooperation, especially visible cooperation at the regional level. When unreservedly positive Turkish public attitudes toward the United States are confined to single digits, bilateral relations face a serious challenge -- a challenge given further meaning by the heightened international debate about American power and purpose.

On the Turkish side, relations with the United States have been transformed by the emergence of Europe as a leading center of gravity for the country, by new regional dynamics, especially in Iraq, and the rise of a more diverse and active foreign policy debate inside the country. The result has been a more wary, ambivalent and often negative attitude toward the United States, against a background of a bilateral agenda that remains, in essence, a legacy of Cold War requirements.

[1] Kemal Kirişci and others have analyzed the continuing role of the ?Sevres Syndrome? in Turkish foreign policy.

[2] For an assessment of what went wrong in American-Turkish negotiations in the run up to the war, see Michael Rubin, ?A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War?, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring 2005.

[3] See Transatlantic Trends 2005 (German Marshall Fund, Compagnia di San Paolo, Fundacao Luso-Americana and Fundacion BBVA, 2005), as well as Pew surveys of recent years.

[4] See Soner Cagaptay, Turkey at a Crossroads: Preserving Ankara´s Western Orientation (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005).


* Dr. Ian Lesser is Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, where he leads a project on ?Reshaping the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Relationship.? He is also president of Mediterranean Advisors. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's, and do not represent the views of the Turkish Daily News, the Wilson Center or its research sponsors.

Iran's High Speed Torpedo Scam

by James Dunnigan
April 23, 2006
Discussion Board on this DLS topic

Iran recently announced the successful test of a new, high-speed torpedo, one that could move through the water at speeds of up to 100 meters a second. This is four times as fast as conventional torpedoes, and is thus nearly "unavoidable" by its intended target.

The new Iranian weapon is apparently based upon Russia's VA-111 Shkval (Squall) torpedo. The Shkval is a high-speed supercavitating rocket-propelled torpedo originally designed to be a rapid-reaction defense against US submarines. Basically an underwater missile, the solid-rocket propelled torpedo achieves its speed by producing an envelope of supercavitating bubbles from its nose and skin, which coat the entire weapon surface in a thin layer of gas. This drastically reduces metal-to-water friction. The torpedo leaves the tube at nearly a hundred kilometers an hour, then lights its rocket motor. In tests in the 1990s the Shkval reportedly had an 80 percent kill probability at a range about seven kilometers, although steerability was reportedly limited.

The reliability of such rocket-propelled torpedoes remains uncertain. The much publicized loss of the Russian submarine "Kursk" was, according to some sources, likely due to an accidental rocket motor start of such a torpedo while still aboard the boat. News of this new Iranian weapon was accompanied by the announcement that Iran had also tested a new ballistic missile, the Fajr-3, which employs some stealth technology and carries several warheads.Â

Iran's possession and successful testing of this weapon is troublesome for several reasons. One is Iran's increasing belligerence, especially towards nuclear-armed Israel (which is estimated to have at least 200 nuclear weapons and the missiles and submarines to deliver them) as well as an almost equal antipathy towards the US. Another reason to worry is Russia's apparent intent to continue close economic ties with Iran and the resulting transfer of its technology to this Islamic state run by fanatics and others who are apparently just plain nuts.Â

Iran is believed to have three late-model Kilo class SSKs bought from Russia, eight mini-subs purchased from North Korea, and several older boats of unknown type. The navy has several dozen fast attack boats that might carry the new torpedo but whose capabilities are in other ways modest. Its small fleet of P-3K "Orion" aircraft could conceivably also carry such a torpedo although it is unknown if Iran plans to arm its Orions with the new torpedo. Iran's navy is the smallest of its armed forces.

However, there is also the matter of credibility and capability. For decades, Iran has continually boasted of new, Iranian designed and manufactured weapons, only to have the rather more somber truth leak out later. Iran's weapons design capabilities are primitive, but the government has some excellent publicists, who always manage to grab some headlines initially, before anyone can question the basic facts behind these amazing new weapons. Take, for example, the new wonder torpedo. The Russians have not had any success convincing the world's navy that their rocket propelled torpedo is a real threat. For one thing, the attacking sub has to get relatively close (within seven kilometers) to use it. Modern anti-submarine tactics focus on preventing subs from getting that close. For that reason, the Russians themselves tout the VA-111 Shkval torpedo as a specialized anti-submarine weapon for Russian subs being stalked by other subs. This is also questionable, because Shkval is essentially unguided. You have to turn the firing sub and line it up so that the Shkval, on leaving the torpedo tube and lighting off its rocket motor, will be aimed directly at the distant target. Do the math, and you will see that there is little margin for error, or chance of success, with such a weapon. If the Iranians bought the Shkval technology from Russia, they got the bad end of the deal.

http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/2006423225356.asp

Iran's High Speed Torpedo Scam

by James Dunnigan
April 23, 2006
Discussion Board on this DLS topic

Iran recently announced the successful test of a new, high-speed torpedo, one that could move through the water at speeds of up to 100 meters a second. This is four times as fast as conventional torpedoes, and is thus nearly "unavoidable" by its intended target.

The new Iranian weapon is apparently based upon Russia's VA-111 Shkval (Squall) torpedo. The Shkval is a high-speed supercavitating rocket-propelled torpedo originally designed to be a rapid-reaction defense against US submarines. Basically an underwater missile, the solid-rocket propelled torpedo achieves its speed by producing an envelope of supercavitating bubbles from its nose and skin, which coat the entire weapon surface in a thin layer of gas. This drastically reduces metal-to-water friction. The torpedo leaves the tube at nearly a hundred kilometers an hour, then lights its rocket motor. In tests in the 1990s the Shkval reportedly had an 80 percent kill probability at a range about seven kilometers, although steerability was reportedly limited.

The reliability of such rocket-propelled torpedoes remains uncertain. The much publicized loss of the Russian submarine "Kursk" was, according to some sources, likely due to an accidental rocket motor start of such a torpedo while still aboard the boat. News of this new Iranian weapon was accompanied by the announcement that Iran had also tested a new ballistic missile, the Fajr-3, which employs some stealth technology and carries several warheads.Â

Iran's possession and successful testing of this weapon is troublesome for several reasons. One is Iran's increasing belligerence, especially towards nuclear-armed Israel (which is estimated to have at least 200 nuclear weapons and the missiles and submarines to deliver them) as well as an almost equal antipathy towards the US. Another reason to worry is Russia's apparent intent to continue close economic ties with Iran and the resulting transfer of its technology to this Islamic state run by fanatics and others who are apparently just plain nuts.Â

Iran is believed to have three late-model Kilo class SSKs bought from Russia, eight mini-subs purchased from North Korea, and several older boats of unknown type. The navy has several dozen fast attack boats that might carry the new torpedo but whose capabilities are in other ways modest. Its small fleet of P-3K "Orion" aircraft could conceivably also carry such a torpedo although it is unknown if Iran plans to arm its Orions with the new torpedo. Iran's navy is the smallest of its armed forces.

However, there is also the matter of credibility and capability. For decades, Iran has continually boasted of new, Iranian designed and manufactured weapons, only to have the rather more somber truth leak out later. Iran's weapons design capabilities are primitive, but the government has some excellent publicists, who always manage to grab some headlines initially, before anyone can question the basic facts behind these amazing new weapons. Take, for example, the new wonder torpedo. The Russians have not had any success convincing the world's navy that their rocket propelled torpedo is a real threat. For one thing, the attacking sub has to get relatively close (within seven kilometers) to use it. Modern anti-submarine tactics focus on preventing subs from getting that close. For that reason, the Russians themselves tout the VA-111 Shkval torpedo as a specialized anti-submarine weapon for Russian subs being stalked by other subs. This is also questionable, because Shkval is essentially unguided. You have to turn the firing sub and line it up so that the Shkval, on leaving the torpedo tube and lighting off its rocket motor, will be aimed directly at the distant target. Do the math, and you will see that there is little margin for error, or chance of success, with such a weapon. If the Iranians bought the Shkval technology from Russia, they got the bad end of the deal.

http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/2006423225356.asp