US-Turkey Nuclear Cooperation: What Does It Mean for Turkey?
The Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement between the United States and Turkey, signed by the two sides on July 26, 2000, has recently been ratified by the Turkish government. The agreement rightly and by definition prohibits Turkey from exploiting the cooperation for any purposes which would directly or indirectly help her develop military nuclear capabilities, which is something that both parties would seemingly agree upon.
However, beyond limiting Turkey?s prospective nuclear capabilities to civilian purposes, the agreement seems to aim at bringing even Turkey?s civilian nuclear projects under US control. As such, for the United States, the US-Turkish Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is a diplomatic triumph whereas, for Turkey, it seems to be nothing more than self-shackling, and a voided attempt at developing even civilian nuclear capabilities.
A Critical Analysis of the Agreement: What it means for Turkey
The US-Turkey Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is essentially an affirmation of both countries? support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As such, the agreement prohibits Turkey from using any nuclear capability it might develop for military purposes and directly or indirectly assisting any other country to develop military nuclear capabilities. However, while it should be equally binding on the United States too, apparently it will not be so.
The Bush Administration has recently passed a resolution in Congress which will enable it to sell nuclear technology, material and equipment to India for the construction of 22 new nuclear reactors, eight of which will be exempt from the IAEA inspection and are likely to be used for military purposes. Therefore, the nuclear civilian cooperation agreement and the so-called affirmation of support for the IAEA objectives constitute simply a pretext to enable the US to increase its influence on Turkey?s prospective nuclear projects and to grant itself the legitimacy to interfere.
Moreover, the benefits of the agreement seem to be rather rhetorical than substantial. The agreement suggests that the parties can collaborate in research and development toward civilian purposes, design educational and staff exchange programs, and co-organize workshops and conferences. Yet, it prohibits the transfer of critical nuclear technology between the parties, or in more practical terms, prohibits the transfer of the critical nuclear technology from the United States to Turkey. Similarly, the agreement imposes a limit to the amount of nuclear material that Turkey can obtain from the US. That is, Turkey cannot obtain the necessary quantity of nuclear material to run its nuclear reactors efficiently, but rather only as much as the amount determined in the agreement.
In addition, the agreement consists of conditions regarding the storage, re-transfer, re-processing and enrichment of the nuclear materials that are likely to complicate or even stall future nuclear cooperation between the US and Turkey. First, the plutonium, uranium 233 and/or enriched uranium produced from the nuclear materials transferred or to be transferred, or through the use of these nuclear materials can be stored in only where both parties agree upon.
The biggest challenge to satisfying this condition would be to bring not only the US and Turkish government, but also the Turkish public opinion into equilibrium. Second, Turkey will not be able to sell third parties any material and/or equipment which it produces by using the nuclear material and/or equipment transferred via this agreement, without American approval. Third, the nuclear materials produced through either direct or indirect use of the nuclear material transferred via this agreement will not be re-processed unless the both parties agree. Finally, the uranium transferred or produced via the material or equipment that has been transferred will not be enriched unless both the US and Turkey agree.
Even though the statements in the agreement frequently repeat the phrase ?unless both parties agree,? since there are only two involved parties, it practically means ?unless the United States agrees or allows Turkey to?? That is, Turkey may follow any policy regarding the storage, re-transfer, re-processing and enrichment of the transferred nuclear material only if the United States allows her to do so.
The wording of the agreement is particularly important given past experience of US-Turkish relations. The agreement states that the United States will try to provide the nuclear fuel on time, which is necessary for Turkey?s prospective nuclear reactors to run efficiently, economically, securely, and continuously. In other words, the failure to provide the necessary fuel to the reactors on time or the possible disruptions in its supply will cause the very nuclear reactors to run inefficiently, uneconomically, insecurely, and disruptively. No need to mention that the discontinuity of the nuclear fuel supply will simply turn the nuclear reactors into useless constructions dangerous for both human health and the natural environment.
The critical word in this section of the agreement is that the US will try to deliver on this promise of nuclear fuel supply. Interestingly enough, the former-Chief of General Staff I. Hakki Karadayi opposed the AKP government?s envisioned support to the United States by reminding that Dick Cheney, when US Secretary of Defense, promised that the United States would try to compensate for Turkey?s economic losses because of the First Gulf War, during the Ozal government. Karadayi noted that the promised compensation never came through.
For the Turks, One Thing to Cheer About
At the least, there is still one thing for Turkey to cheer about with this agreement. As far as the information revealed to the media suggests, the agreement does not prohibit Turkey from developing similar civilian nuclear partnerships with other countries, and does not confine Turkey to purchasing the necessary nuclear technology, fuel, material and equipment only from the United States. Therefore, Turkey may still seek other suppliers who are willing to be more accommodating in their interactions with Turkey.
Such suppliers could possibly be France, Canada, or closer to home, Russia and Israel. Developing such diversified supply channels would also comply with the United States? practice, in that it has already cemented civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with 47 countries, and is now about to sign one with Russia.
Indeed, the Bush Administration has recently embarked on negotiations with Russia, which could eventually lead to a nuclear civilian cooperation agreement between the two countries. The idea of the US-Russian nuclear cooperation initiative has received harsh criticism from both Republican and Democratic congressmen, most notably from Arizona?s Republican Senator John McCain (R-AZ), who views the initiative as a reward for bad behavior on the part of Moscow and as assisting the restoration of autocracy in Russia.
However, administration officials have stressed the beneficial aspects of the deal. Nicholas Burns, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, suggests that working with Russia on a civilian nuclear cooperation is in the American national interest since Russia has proven itself a key player in negotiations with Iran. Similarly, with the recently renewed US-Indian nuclear partnership, the Bush administration claims to have aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The only problem with the initiative seems to be that it is likely to help India develop nuclear weapons instead.
Actual practice has shown that the so-called ?civil nuclear cooperation agreements? do not necessarily curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, despite their stated intent to do so. Rather, the parties to such agreement view them simply as a means for pursuing their national interests. Depending on how you define them, civil nuclear agreements may well yield to developing military nuclear capabilities as well. The only thing that involved parties must be careful about is how the other side perceives the agreement and accordingly words its conditions.
balkanalysis.com
However, beyond limiting Turkey?s prospective nuclear capabilities to civilian purposes, the agreement seems to aim at bringing even Turkey?s civilian nuclear projects under US control. As such, for the United States, the US-Turkish Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is a diplomatic triumph whereas, for Turkey, it seems to be nothing more than self-shackling, and a voided attempt at developing even civilian nuclear capabilities.
A Critical Analysis of the Agreement: What it means for Turkey
The US-Turkey Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is essentially an affirmation of both countries? support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As such, the agreement prohibits Turkey from using any nuclear capability it might develop for military purposes and directly or indirectly assisting any other country to develop military nuclear capabilities. However, while it should be equally binding on the United States too, apparently it will not be so.
The Bush Administration has recently passed a resolution in Congress which will enable it to sell nuclear technology, material and equipment to India for the construction of 22 new nuclear reactors, eight of which will be exempt from the IAEA inspection and are likely to be used for military purposes. Therefore, the nuclear civilian cooperation agreement and the so-called affirmation of support for the IAEA objectives constitute simply a pretext to enable the US to increase its influence on Turkey?s prospective nuclear projects and to grant itself the legitimacy to interfere.
Moreover, the benefits of the agreement seem to be rather rhetorical than substantial. The agreement suggests that the parties can collaborate in research and development toward civilian purposes, design educational and staff exchange programs, and co-organize workshops and conferences. Yet, it prohibits the transfer of critical nuclear technology between the parties, or in more practical terms, prohibits the transfer of the critical nuclear technology from the United States to Turkey. Similarly, the agreement imposes a limit to the amount of nuclear material that Turkey can obtain from the US. That is, Turkey cannot obtain the necessary quantity of nuclear material to run its nuclear reactors efficiently, but rather only as much as the amount determined in the agreement.
In addition, the agreement consists of conditions regarding the storage, re-transfer, re-processing and enrichment of the nuclear materials that are likely to complicate or even stall future nuclear cooperation between the US and Turkey. First, the plutonium, uranium 233 and/or enriched uranium produced from the nuclear materials transferred or to be transferred, or through the use of these nuclear materials can be stored in only where both parties agree upon.
The biggest challenge to satisfying this condition would be to bring not only the US and Turkish government, but also the Turkish public opinion into equilibrium. Second, Turkey will not be able to sell third parties any material and/or equipment which it produces by using the nuclear material and/or equipment transferred via this agreement, without American approval. Third, the nuclear materials produced through either direct or indirect use of the nuclear material transferred via this agreement will not be re-processed unless the both parties agree. Finally, the uranium transferred or produced via the material or equipment that has been transferred will not be enriched unless both the US and Turkey agree.
Even though the statements in the agreement frequently repeat the phrase ?unless both parties agree,? since there are only two involved parties, it practically means ?unless the United States agrees or allows Turkey to?? That is, Turkey may follow any policy regarding the storage, re-transfer, re-processing and enrichment of the transferred nuclear material only if the United States allows her to do so.
The wording of the agreement is particularly important given past experience of US-Turkish relations. The agreement states that the United States will try to provide the nuclear fuel on time, which is necessary for Turkey?s prospective nuclear reactors to run efficiently, economically, securely, and continuously. In other words, the failure to provide the necessary fuel to the reactors on time or the possible disruptions in its supply will cause the very nuclear reactors to run inefficiently, uneconomically, insecurely, and disruptively. No need to mention that the discontinuity of the nuclear fuel supply will simply turn the nuclear reactors into useless constructions dangerous for both human health and the natural environment.
The critical word in this section of the agreement is that the US will try to deliver on this promise of nuclear fuel supply. Interestingly enough, the former-Chief of General Staff I. Hakki Karadayi opposed the AKP government?s envisioned support to the United States by reminding that Dick Cheney, when US Secretary of Defense, promised that the United States would try to compensate for Turkey?s economic losses because of the First Gulf War, during the Ozal government. Karadayi noted that the promised compensation never came through.
For the Turks, One Thing to Cheer About
At the least, there is still one thing for Turkey to cheer about with this agreement. As far as the information revealed to the media suggests, the agreement does not prohibit Turkey from developing similar civilian nuclear partnerships with other countries, and does not confine Turkey to purchasing the necessary nuclear technology, fuel, material and equipment only from the United States. Therefore, Turkey may still seek other suppliers who are willing to be more accommodating in their interactions with Turkey.
Such suppliers could possibly be France, Canada, or closer to home, Russia and Israel. Developing such diversified supply channels would also comply with the United States? practice, in that it has already cemented civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with 47 countries, and is now about to sign one with Russia.
Indeed, the Bush Administration has recently embarked on negotiations with Russia, which could eventually lead to a nuclear civilian cooperation agreement between the two countries. The idea of the US-Russian nuclear cooperation initiative has received harsh criticism from both Republican and Democratic congressmen, most notably from Arizona?s Republican Senator John McCain (R-AZ), who views the initiative as a reward for bad behavior on the part of Moscow and as assisting the restoration of autocracy in Russia.
However, administration officials have stressed the beneficial aspects of the deal. Nicholas Burns, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, suggests that working with Russia on a civilian nuclear cooperation is in the American national interest since Russia has proven itself a key player in negotiations with Iran. Similarly, with the recently renewed US-Indian nuclear partnership, the Bush administration claims to have aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The only problem with the initiative seems to be that it is likely to help India develop nuclear weapons instead.
Actual practice has shown that the so-called ?civil nuclear cooperation agreements? do not necessarily curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, despite their stated intent to do so. Rather, the parties to such agreement view them simply as a means for pursuing their national interests. Depending on how you define them, civil nuclear agreements may well yield to developing military nuclear capabilities as well. The only thing that involved parties must be careful about is how the other side perceives the agreement and accordingly words its conditions.
balkanalysis.com
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