Off Autopilot: The future of Turkish-US relations (I)
IAN O. LESSER
TDN Guest Writer
For decades, the relationship between Ankara and Washington has been described as strategic -- durable and supportive of the most important international objectives of both sides, especially in security terms. Today, the strategic quality of the relationship can no longer be taken for granted as a result of divergent perceptions of the Iraq war, and more importantly, changing foreign policy debates in both countries. As a result, a bilateral relationship of great geopolitical significance, but one that has operated largely on autopilot since the early years of the Cold War, is now in question. A reinvigorated strategic relationship will be in the interest of both countries, but is likely to have quite different contours.
To be sure, disagreements in the bilateral relationship between Turkey and the United States are nothing new. The Johnson Letter and the arms embargo following the 1974 Cyprus crisis were only the most striking examples of periodic friction between successive Turkish and American administrations, even against a background of shared strategic purpose. For decades, the need to contain Soviet power shaped the relationship, and set expectations about what Washington and Ankara could offer in security terms. The potential demands on the relationship were substantial, including the use of Turkish territory for nuclear strikes against targets in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the U.S. might have been required to risk nuclear retaliation against its own territory in defense of Turkey. In retrospect, these contingencies seem highly improbable, but they were not seen as remote or inconceivable even as late as the 1980s.
In the Cold War period, the strategic relationship appeared solid because it was never really tested in terms of mutual defense. It was only later, with the Gulf War of 1990, that Turkey was called upon to provide extensive support for coalition operations (Turkey's own requests for air defense reinforcements from NATO were met only after substantial delay -- an experience that still influences Turkish thinking about the country's collective defense arrangements). Turkey's forward leaning stance in the Gulf War left important and somewhat divergent lessons for both sides. In the U.S., the experience of 1990-91 reinforced the image of Turkey as a strategic ally, at the forefront of new security challenges emanating from the Middle East, an impression Turkish policy makers have sought to reinforce with American policy audiences.
In Turkey, by contrast, the first Iraq conflict and the experience of operations Provide Comfort and Northern Watch, are widely viewed as the place where the "trouble" started, with trouble defined as the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) insurgency, more complicated relations with Syria and Iran, and more contentious relations with Washington. It is worth recalling that the years following the first war with Iraq were characterized by frequent bilateral disagreements, over the conduct of counter-PKK operations in southeastern Anatolia and northern Iraq, but also over Turkish and Greek policy in the Aegean. In the mid 1990s, many Turks came to see the United States as a less-than-reliable ally, and some Americans came to see Turkey as part ally, part rogue state. In this climate of mistrust, which was also part of the equation in Turkey-EU relations, it is not surprising that Ankara sought to develop strategic alternatives, including a deeper defense relationship with Israel.
Even in the post-Cold War period, when the geopolitical containment of Soviet power was no longer a driver of security policy, both Ankara and Washington have persisted in seeing Turkey's geographic position as the basis for Turkey's strategic importance, and, ultimately, as the center of gravity for bilateral cooperation. Turkey's proximity to areas of interest and crisis -- in the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Middle East, has made questions of access -- for the projection of military power, or the transportation of energy -- the center of gravity for strategic cooperation with Ankara. This realtor's view of strategy -- ?location, location, location? -- has not served either side well in a post-containment era of diffuse regional problems, less than existential threats, and new debates about national power and purpose on both sides of the Atlantic.
A different Turkey:
Domestic developments and changing national perceptions are part of the equation on both sides. In Turkey, several factors have driven policymakers and the public toward a more wary and ambivalent approach to bilateral relations. Some of these factors may be transitory, others are almost certainly structural.
First, the accelerated pace of Turkish-EU relations has changed the foreign policy debate in ways that inevitably affect relations with the U.S. Regardless of the actual outlook for Turkish membership, a path fraught with pitfalls but also many opportunities over the next decade or more, the process of continued Turkish convergence with European practices and institutions is likely to continue. This process of convergence is, ultimately, what counts for Europe and the United States, and quite possibly for Turks as well.
The U.S. has been a consistent champion of Turkey in Europe, even if Washington's ability to push Turkey's case (and the need to do so) has declined steadily since the Helsinki Summit. Now that Turkey is launched on the path of accession, however uncertain, policymakers on all sides will need to ask more serious questions about the implications for U.S.-Turkish relations over the next decade. Some Europeans may persist in their fear that Turkey within the EU will serve as a ?Trojan Horse? for American foreign policy preferences. In reality, closer Turkey-EU relations will almost certainly pose a greater challenge of adjustment for Washington. Turkish policy is already within the European mainstream, and far closer to European than American approaches on a range of key issues, not least Iran, Iraq and the Middle East peace process. This essentially European orientation extends to contentious global issues, including the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto protocols on climate change.
Even if Turkey's candidacy stalls, or proves hollow over the coming years, the result is unlikely to be closer ties with Washington. Under conditions of estrangement from Europe, Turkish opinion could well shift in the direction of a more sovereignty conscious, nationalistic posture, a development that would complicate relations with Washington as much as Brussels. Only against a background of vastly heightened regional risk, against which American deterrence and reassurance would be essential, would a return to closer strategic cooperation with the U.S. be the natural outcome. Scenarios that could trigger this response include renewed competition with a more assertive Russia, or friction with a nuclear-armed Iran. If Turkey's candidacy proceeds apace and the process of Europeanization continues, this could encourage a useful diversification and deepening of Turkish-U.S. ties, especially on the economic front. Under this scenario, movement toward Europe can have a multiplier effect on trade and investment links to the U.S. This effect could also be felt in the political and security realm, but only if transatlantic relations as a whole develop positively.
Second, new regional dynamics have complicated cooperation. America's intervention on Turkey's Middle Eastern borders has given the question of bilateral relations a much sharper edge. The Iraq war touches on the most sensitive problems affecting Turkish society and politics, above all, the issue of Kurdish identity within Turkey and across the region. The AKP government may have encouraged a more open and active debate on the Kurdish issue, but it remains a flashpoint across the political spectrum. Experience since 1990 has reinforced the impression that developments in Iraq (as well as Syria and Iran) are intimately linked to Turkey's own internal security. The recent revival of the PKK insurgency has only underscored the significance of developments in this area, and revived fears of western -- and especially American -- encouragement for Kurdish nationalism in northern Iraq, and potentially inside Turkey. Ankara very nearly came to blows with Syria over its support for the PKK in 1998, and Turkey has intervened in northern Iraq as part of its cross-border counter-insurgency strategy. In short, the Kurdish-Iraqi equation is the most troubled dimension of the country's external policy, and one subject to historic sensitivities at the public and elite levels.[1] In the wake of the Iraq War, it has also become the focal point for bilateral engagement -- and friction -- with Washington.[2]
To be sure, many Turks misjudge American strategy and intentions with regard to Kurdish separatism and Iraq. Successive American administrations have made clear that the United States does not favor a break-up of Iraq, or an independent Kurdish state, and certainly not one that might threaten the integrity and security of a NATO ally. Repeated assurances on this score have done little to reduce the now widespread Turkish suspicion regarding American policy in northern Iraq. The most tangible demonstration of American commitment to the policy of a united Iraq and a secure Turkey would be concerted action against PKK bases and cells in the region. Many American strategists would favor this. But with immense demands on American attention and resources elsewhere in a still highly unstable Iraq, few policymakers will be enthusiastic about opening new fronts inside the country, especially in a region that appears relatively secure from the vantage point of Washington. As a result, American policymakers have been unable to act in the one area that might reassure Turks about the direction of U.S. policy.
Beyond Iraq, Turkey under the Erdoğan government has pursued a policy of more active engagement in the Middle East, even as relations with Europe have taken center stage. This is not to say that Turkey has overcome its traditional ambivalence regarding relations with Middle Eastern neighbors. Few Turks would seriously argue that ties to the south and east represent a real economic and foreign policy alternative to relations with the West. But the two can certainly coexist as areas for Turkish external engagement, and the AKP government seems inclined to test this proposition to a far greater extent than its predecessors. High level discussions with Syrian and Iranian policymakers, and some high-profile visits and cooperation agreements point in this direction, at a time when U.S. -- and European -- policy toward both Damascus and Tehran is becoming more assertive.
Third, public opinion now counts in Turkish foreign policymaking, and as polling results suggest, this opinion has turned distinctly anti-American in recent years. Recent surveys indicate that Turkish public attitudes toward the United States are now the most negative in Europe.[3] This marked deterioration in perceptions of the United States has special significance for relations between the Erdoğan and Bush administrations. Here, an avowedly populist government in Ankara must deal with a more active and interventionist leadership in Washington, one that confronts Turkey with multiple policy dilemmas in its neighborhood. It is a challenging mixture, and one that is not, of course, unique to Turkish-American relations. Indeed, Turkish public opinion, sensitive to both European and Muslim concerns (e.g., Palestinian aspirations), has multiple sources of pressure when it comes to attitudes toward the U.S. To this must be added the tendency of some American foreign and security policy elites to ignore the changes that have taken place on the Turkish scene over the last decade, in particular the greatly increased role of public opinion and the emergence of new actors in the Turkish policy debate. In this as in several other key areas, relations have remained on autopilot, with only limited attempts to engage new constituencies beyond traditional bilateral partners on the Turkish side. Indeed, even the traditional partners, such as the Turkish military and security establishment, appear ambivalent regarding strategic cooperation with the United States (this was also the case in the early 1990s).
The trend toward strongly negative attitudes about the United States might be reversed, or at least offset, by new policy initiatives seen as favorable to Turkish interests, most notably on the issue of the PKK presence in northern Iraq, or on Cyprus, although the latter is increasingly seen as an area for European initiative by Washington.[4] So too, an overall improvement in transatlantic relations and perceptions of the United States would probably have an effect on public attitudes in Turkey. Yet, without change in these areas, the state of Turkish public opinion will continue to limit the scope for bilateral cooperation, especially visible cooperation at the regional level. When unreservedly positive Turkish public attitudes toward the United States are confined to single digits, bilateral relations face a serious challenge -- a challenge given further meaning by the heightened international debate about American power and purpose.
On the Turkish side, relations with the United States have been transformed by the emergence of Europe as a leading center of gravity for the country, by new regional dynamics, especially in Iraq, and the rise of a more diverse and active foreign policy debate inside the country. The result has been a more wary, ambivalent and often negative attitude toward the United States, against a background of a bilateral agenda that remains, in essence, a legacy of Cold War requirements.
[1] Kemal Kirişci and others have analyzed the continuing role of the ?Sevres Syndrome? in Turkish foreign policy.
[2] For an assessment of what went wrong in American-Turkish negotiations in the run up to the war, see Michael Rubin, ?A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War?, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring 2005.
[3] See Transatlantic Trends 2005 (German Marshall Fund, Compagnia di San Paolo, Fundacao Luso-Americana and Fundacion BBVA, 2005), as well as Pew surveys of recent years.
[4] See Soner Cagaptay, Turkey at a Crossroads: Preserving Ankara´s Western Orientation (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005).
* Dr. Ian Lesser is Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, where he leads a project on ?Reshaping the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Relationship.? He is also president of Mediterranean Advisors. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's, and do not represent the views of the Turkish Daily News, the Wilson Center or its research sponsors.
TDN Guest Writer
For decades, the relationship between Ankara and Washington has been described as strategic -- durable and supportive of the most important international objectives of both sides, especially in security terms. Today, the strategic quality of the relationship can no longer be taken for granted as a result of divergent perceptions of the Iraq war, and more importantly, changing foreign policy debates in both countries. As a result, a bilateral relationship of great geopolitical significance, but one that has operated largely on autopilot since the early years of the Cold War, is now in question. A reinvigorated strategic relationship will be in the interest of both countries, but is likely to have quite different contours.
To be sure, disagreements in the bilateral relationship between Turkey and the United States are nothing new. The Johnson Letter and the arms embargo following the 1974 Cyprus crisis were only the most striking examples of periodic friction between successive Turkish and American administrations, even against a background of shared strategic purpose. For decades, the need to contain Soviet power shaped the relationship, and set expectations about what Washington and Ankara could offer in security terms. The potential demands on the relationship were substantial, including the use of Turkish territory for nuclear strikes against targets in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the U.S. might have been required to risk nuclear retaliation against its own territory in defense of Turkey. In retrospect, these contingencies seem highly improbable, but they were not seen as remote or inconceivable even as late as the 1980s.
In the Cold War period, the strategic relationship appeared solid because it was never really tested in terms of mutual defense. It was only later, with the Gulf War of 1990, that Turkey was called upon to provide extensive support for coalition operations (Turkey's own requests for air defense reinforcements from NATO were met only after substantial delay -- an experience that still influences Turkish thinking about the country's collective defense arrangements). Turkey's forward leaning stance in the Gulf War left important and somewhat divergent lessons for both sides. In the U.S., the experience of 1990-91 reinforced the image of Turkey as a strategic ally, at the forefront of new security challenges emanating from the Middle East, an impression Turkish policy makers have sought to reinforce with American policy audiences.
In Turkey, by contrast, the first Iraq conflict and the experience of operations Provide Comfort and Northern Watch, are widely viewed as the place where the "trouble" started, with trouble defined as the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) insurgency, more complicated relations with Syria and Iran, and more contentious relations with Washington. It is worth recalling that the years following the first war with Iraq were characterized by frequent bilateral disagreements, over the conduct of counter-PKK operations in southeastern Anatolia and northern Iraq, but also over Turkish and Greek policy in the Aegean. In the mid 1990s, many Turks came to see the United States as a less-than-reliable ally, and some Americans came to see Turkey as part ally, part rogue state. In this climate of mistrust, which was also part of the equation in Turkey-EU relations, it is not surprising that Ankara sought to develop strategic alternatives, including a deeper defense relationship with Israel.
Even in the post-Cold War period, when the geopolitical containment of Soviet power was no longer a driver of security policy, both Ankara and Washington have persisted in seeing Turkey's geographic position as the basis for Turkey's strategic importance, and, ultimately, as the center of gravity for bilateral cooperation. Turkey's proximity to areas of interest and crisis -- in the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Middle East, has made questions of access -- for the projection of military power, or the transportation of energy -- the center of gravity for strategic cooperation with Ankara. This realtor's view of strategy -- ?location, location, location? -- has not served either side well in a post-containment era of diffuse regional problems, less than existential threats, and new debates about national power and purpose on both sides of the Atlantic.
A different Turkey:
Domestic developments and changing national perceptions are part of the equation on both sides. In Turkey, several factors have driven policymakers and the public toward a more wary and ambivalent approach to bilateral relations. Some of these factors may be transitory, others are almost certainly structural.
First, the accelerated pace of Turkish-EU relations has changed the foreign policy debate in ways that inevitably affect relations with the U.S. Regardless of the actual outlook for Turkish membership, a path fraught with pitfalls but also many opportunities over the next decade or more, the process of continued Turkish convergence with European practices and institutions is likely to continue. This process of convergence is, ultimately, what counts for Europe and the United States, and quite possibly for Turks as well.
The U.S. has been a consistent champion of Turkey in Europe, even if Washington's ability to push Turkey's case (and the need to do so) has declined steadily since the Helsinki Summit. Now that Turkey is launched on the path of accession, however uncertain, policymakers on all sides will need to ask more serious questions about the implications for U.S.-Turkish relations over the next decade. Some Europeans may persist in their fear that Turkey within the EU will serve as a ?Trojan Horse? for American foreign policy preferences. In reality, closer Turkey-EU relations will almost certainly pose a greater challenge of adjustment for Washington. Turkish policy is already within the European mainstream, and far closer to European than American approaches on a range of key issues, not least Iran, Iraq and the Middle East peace process. This essentially European orientation extends to contentious global issues, including the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto protocols on climate change.
Even if Turkey's candidacy stalls, or proves hollow over the coming years, the result is unlikely to be closer ties with Washington. Under conditions of estrangement from Europe, Turkish opinion could well shift in the direction of a more sovereignty conscious, nationalistic posture, a development that would complicate relations with Washington as much as Brussels. Only against a background of vastly heightened regional risk, against which American deterrence and reassurance would be essential, would a return to closer strategic cooperation with the U.S. be the natural outcome. Scenarios that could trigger this response include renewed competition with a more assertive Russia, or friction with a nuclear-armed Iran. If Turkey's candidacy proceeds apace and the process of Europeanization continues, this could encourage a useful diversification and deepening of Turkish-U.S. ties, especially on the economic front. Under this scenario, movement toward Europe can have a multiplier effect on trade and investment links to the U.S. This effect could also be felt in the political and security realm, but only if transatlantic relations as a whole develop positively.
Second, new regional dynamics have complicated cooperation. America's intervention on Turkey's Middle Eastern borders has given the question of bilateral relations a much sharper edge. The Iraq war touches on the most sensitive problems affecting Turkish society and politics, above all, the issue of Kurdish identity within Turkey and across the region. The AKP government may have encouraged a more open and active debate on the Kurdish issue, but it remains a flashpoint across the political spectrum. Experience since 1990 has reinforced the impression that developments in Iraq (as well as Syria and Iran) are intimately linked to Turkey's own internal security. The recent revival of the PKK insurgency has only underscored the significance of developments in this area, and revived fears of western -- and especially American -- encouragement for Kurdish nationalism in northern Iraq, and potentially inside Turkey. Ankara very nearly came to blows with Syria over its support for the PKK in 1998, and Turkey has intervened in northern Iraq as part of its cross-border counter-insurgency strategy. In short, the Kurdish-Iraqi equation is the most troubled dimension of the country's external policy, and one subject to historic sensitivities at the public and elite levels.[1] In the wake of the Iraq War, it has also become the focal point for bilateral engagement -- and friction -- with Washington.[2]
To be sure, many Turks misjudge American strategy and intentions with regard to Kurdish separatism and Iraq. Successive American administrations have made clear that the United States does not favor a break-up of Iraq, or an independent Kurdish state, and certainly not one that might threaten the integrity and security of a NATO ally. Repeated assurances on this score have done little to reduce the now widespread Turkish suspicion regarding American policy in northern Iraq. The most tangible demonstration of American commitment to the policy of a united Iraq and a secure Turkey would be concerted action against PKK bases and cells in the region. Many American strategists would favor this. But with immense demands on American attention and resources elsewhere in a still highly unstable Iraq, few policymakers will be enthusiastic about opening new fronts inside the country, especially in a region that appears relatively secure from the vantage point of Washington. As a result, American policymakers have been unable to act in the one area that might reassure Turks about the direction of U.S. policy.
Beyond Iraq, Turkey under the Erdoğan government has pursued a policy of more active engagement in the Middle East, even as relations with Europe have taken center stage. This is not to say that Turkey has overcome its traditional ambivalence regarding relations with Middle Eastern neighbors. Few Turks would seriously argue that ties to the south and east represent a real economic and foreign policy alternative to relations with the West. But the two can certainly coexist as areas for Turkish external engagement, and the AKP government seems inclined to test this proposition to a far greater extent than its predecessors. High level discussions with Syrian and Iranian policymakers, and some high-profile visits and cooperation agreements point in this direction, at a time when U.S. -- and European -- policy toward both Damascus and Tehran is becoming more assertive.
Third, public opinion now counts in Turkish foreign policymaking, and as polling results suggest, this opinion has turned distinctly anti-American in recent years. Recent surveys indicate that Turkish public attitudes toward the United States are now the most negative in Europe.[3] This marked deterioration in perceptions of the United States has special significance for relations between the Erdoğan and Bush administrations. Here, an avowedly populist government in Ankara must deal with a more active and interventionist leadership in Washington, one that confronts Turkey with multiple policy dilemmas in its neighborhood. It is a challenging mixture, and one that is not, of course, unique to Turkish-American relations. Indeed, Turkish public opinion, sensitive to both European and Muslim concerns (e.g., Palestinian aspirations), has multiple sources of pressure when it comes to attitudes toward the U.S. To this must be added the tendency of some American foreign and security policy elites to ignore the changes that have taken place on the Turkish scene over the last decade, in particular the greatly increased role of public opinion and the emergence of new actors in the Turkish policy debate. In this as in several other key areas, relations have remained on autopilot, with only limited attempts to engage new constituencies beyond traditional bilateral partners on the Turkish side. Indeed, even the traditional partners, such as the Turkish military and security establishment, appear ambivalent regarding strategic cooperation with the United States (this was also the case in the early 1990s).
The trend toward strongly negative attitudes about the United States might be reversed, or at least offset, by new policy initiatives seen as favorable to Turkish interests, most notably on the issue of the PKK presence in northern Iraq, or on Cyprus, although the latter is increasingly seen as an area for European initiative by Washington.[4] So too, an overall improvement in transatlantic relations and perceptions of the United States would probably have an effect on public attitudes in Turkey. Yet, without change in these areas, the state of Turkish public opinion will continue to limit the scope for bilateral cooperation, especially visible cooperation at the regional level. When unreservedly positive Turkish public attitudes toward the United States are confined to single digits, bilateral relations face a serious challenge -- a challenge given further meaning by the heightened international debate about American power and purpose.
On the Turkish side, relations with the United States have been transformed by the emergence of Europe as a leading center of gravity for the country, by new regional dynamics, especially in Iraq, and the rise of a more diverse and active foreign policy debate inside the country. The result has been a more wary, ambivalent and often negative attitude toward the United States, against a background of a bilateral agenda that remains, in essence, a legacy of Cold War requirements.
[1] Kemal Kirişci and others have analyzed the continuing role of the ?Sevres Syndrome? in Turkish foreign policy.
[2] For an assessment of what went wrong in American-Turkish negotiations in the run up to the war, see Michael Rubin, ?A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War?, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring 2005.
[3] See Transatlantic Trends 2005 (German Marshall Fund, Compagnia di San Paolo, Fundacao Luso-Americana and Fundacion BBVA, 2005), as well as Pew surveys of recent years.
[4] See Soner Cagaptay, Turkey at a Crossroads: Preserving Ankara´s Western Orientation (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005).
* Dr. Ian Lesser is Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, where he leads a project on ?Reshaping the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Relationship.? He is also president of Mediterranean Advisors. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's, and do not represent the views of the Turkish Daily News, the Wilson Center or its research sponsors.
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